Gina v. Bisignano
- Dulce Foster
- 0:25-cv-03757
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 9
In Gina V. v. Bisignano, Magistrate Judge Foster denied Plaintiff's request for relief and dismissed her Social Security disability appeal with prejudice, holding that Eighth Circuit precedent forecloses her argument that the ALJ erred by omitting a 'superficial' contact limitation from her work capacity assessment.
People who have applied for Social Security disability benefits (Disability Insurance Benefits or Supplemental Security Income) and whose disability applications were denied based on a residual functional capacity assessment that included 'occasional' but not 'superficial' or 'brief' contact limitations, particularly those appealing in the Eighth Circuit. This ruling confirms that such claimants cannot obtain reversal or remand solely on the ground that the ALJ adopted 'occasional' contact restrictions without separately adopting 'superficial' or 'brief' contact restrictions from opinions the ALJ found persuasive.
What happened
In Gina V. v. Bisignano (Case No. 25-cv-3757), Plaintiff Gina V. sought federal court review of a Social Security Administration decision denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) — the government official who presided over her disability hearing — found her not disabled and limited her work capacity to 'occasional' interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Gina V. argued the ALJ made a legal error by relying on medical opinions the ALJ herself found persuasive, which recommended limiting her to 'brief' and 'superficial' contact with others, without either adopting those more specific restrictions or explaining why she left them out.
The key legal question was whether an ALJ who finds a medical opinion persuasive must either include all of that opinion's specific limitations in the claimant's work capacity assessment or explain why she did not. Multiple judges in the District of Minnesota, including the judge in this case, had previously held that 'occasional' (a limit on how often contact occurs) and 'superficial' (a limit on the depth or quality of contact) are meaningfully different, and that failing to address the distinction was reversible error. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals — the federal appeals court that oversees this district — later rejected that reasoning in two cases, holding that omitting a 'superficial' limitation when an ALJ already includes an 'occasional' limitation does not create a legally significant inconsistency.
Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster denied Gina V.'s request for relief, granted the Commissioner's request for relief, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court found that the Eighth Circuit's rulings directly foreclose the argument Gina V. raised, making it no longer a viable basis for relief in this circuit. The court also noted that Gina V.'s counsel, whose law firm had represented parties in the controlling adverse precedents, failed to acknowledge or distinguish those cases in the briefs.
The detailed version
- Gina v. Bisignano · No. 0:25-cv-03757
- Dulce J. Foster
- June 2, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Gina V. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a September 24, 2024 decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings, including entry of final judgment.
Administrative Findings
The ALJ found that Gina V. suffers from several severe mental health impairments: PTSD, Borderline Personality Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Anxiety. The ALJ then assessed her residual functional capacity (RFC) — meaning the most work-related activity she can still do despite her impairments — and included the following mental limitations: simple tasks in a routine work setting (not at a production rate pace), occasional changes in the workplace that are well explained in advance, and occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.
In assessing the RFC, the ALJ evaluated multiple medical opinions. She rejected the opinion of Plaintiff's long-term therapist, Sarah Janzen, MSW/LICSW, finding it inadequately supported and inconsistent with other evidence. The ALJ found four other opinions "persuasive":
- Dr. Monique Bordeaux, Psy. D. (consultative psychological examiner) — found Plaintiff's ability to tolerate workplace mental stressors was below average and that her conditions could adversely impact relationships in an employment setting, but also noted Plaintiff was friendly and appropriate during the examination.
- Dr. Alford Karayusuf, M.D. (examined Plaintiff in 2016 in connection with a prior claim) — recommended limiting Plaintiff to work involving "brief, superficial, infrequent interactions" with coworkers, supervisors, and the public.
- Dr. Michael Cremerius, Ph.D. (State agency psychological consultant) — limited Plaintiff to "occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors" and "no responsibilities for servicing the public directly."
- Dr. Kiela Bolden, Psy. D. (State agency psychological consultant) — found Plaintiff could "appropriately respond to others and changes in a work setting."
Despite finding Drs. Karayusuf and Cremerius persuasive, the ALJ's RFC limited Plaintiff only to "occasional" interaction with others and did not include a restriction to "brief" or "superficial" contact, as those opinions recommended. The ALJ presented a hypothetical to a vocational expert based on the RFC as written, and the vocational expert testified that a person with Plaintiff's limitations could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The ALJ therefore concluded Plaintiff was not disabled.
The Legal Issue
The sole issue on appeal was whether the ALJ erred by failing either to incorporate the "brief" and "superficial" contact limitations from the persuasive opinions into Plaintiff's RFC, or to articulate a clear rationale for omitting them. Plaintiff's argument rested on the distinction between "occasional" (a quantitative limit — how often contact occurs) and "superficial" (a qualitative limit — the depth or nature of contact), contending these are materially different and that the ALJ's silence on the difference was reversible error.
Prior District Court Precedent vs. Eighth Circuit Precedent
The court acknowledged that numerous judges in the District of Minnesota, including the presiding judge, had previously ruled in favor of plaintiffs on this exact argument — holding that "occasional" and "superficial" are meaningfully distinct and that an ALJ must explain her failure to adopt a superficial contact limitation when she finds a persuasive opinion containing one. The court cited several earlier District of Minnesota cases supporting this position.
However, the court found that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals — whose decisions are binding on this district — subsequently rejected that reasoning. In Lane v. O'Malley, No. 23-1432, 2024 WL 302395 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2024) (per curiam), the Eighth Circuit called the argument a "manufactured inconsistency" and held that an ALJ's use of "occasional" rather than "superficial" does not constitute reversible error even when persuasive opinions use the latter term. The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Wyatt v. Kijakazi, No. 23-1559, 2023 WL 6629761 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023) (per curiam). A subsequent District of Minnesota decision, Jennifer L. v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 23-cv-1822, 2024 WL 4120375 (D. Minn. June 27, 2024), had already applied these Eighth Circuit rulings to foreclose the same argument.
The court further noted that Plaintiff's counsel's law firm had represented the plaintiffs in both Wyatt and Jennifer L. — meaning counsel was plainly aware of these contrary precedents — yet failed to address or attempt to distinguish them in briefing.
Ruling
Magistrate Judge Foster denied Plaintiff's Request for Relief (ECF No. 16), granted Defendant's Request for Relief (ECF No. 20), and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court concluded that Eighth Circuit precedent forecloses Plaintiff's argument, making it no longer viable in this circuit.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.