Marshall Wexler v. Regents University of California, et al.

Background

The court previously dismissed Wexler’s federal claims with prejudice, denied his request to amend the complaint to add new federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. The court entered final judgment on February 12, 2026. Wexler filed a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and a motion for reconsideration.

Motion for Recusal

The court denied recusal. It explained that recusal is required when a reasonable person who knows the relevant facts would reasonably question the judge’s impartiality or perceive a significant risk that the judge would decide the case on a basis other than its merits. The court also explained that a judge’s rulings, opinions, or statements during the litigation generally are not grounds for recusal without an outside source of alleged bias.

Wexler relied on several asserted grounds. The court held that the judge’s status as a University of California, Berkeley, graduate was not enough to establish bias. It also stated that Wexler was factually wrong to suggest that the judge had once worked for the State of California. The court acknowledged that the judge had worked as a civil-rights attorney and had represented Fred Korematsu, but concluded that this history did not create a significant risk that the case would be decided on a basis other than the merits. The court stated that Wexler’s delay in seeking recusal until after unfavorable rulings indicated that he was essentially trying to choose a different judge.

Motion for Reconsideration

Because final judgment had been entered, the court treated Wexler’s reconsideration motion as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. The court described four possible grounds for such relief: a clear legal or factual error, newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, the need to prevent a clear injustice, or an intervening change in controlling law. The court concluded that Wexler had not shown a basis for relief.

The court rejected Wexler’s argument that it had failed to address a proposed amended complaint containing a claim under the Affordable Care Act. It stated that its earlier order had expressly addressed the proposed new federal claims and had found that Wexler still did not plausibly allege discrimination or conspiracy.

The court also rejected Wexler’s argument that it had failed to accept his well-supported factual allegations as true and view them favorably at the complaint stage. The court stated that, under the rules governing challenges to jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, a court may treat allegations as fanciful or dismiss claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.

The court further held that its earlier order had already decided Wexler’s request to amend, so dismissal was not improper merely because the request had allegedly remained pending. It rejected Wexler’s assertion that diversity jurisdiction supported his state-law claims, noting that he provided no evidence that he was not a California citizen and that his allegations and caption indicated connections to California. The court also stated that the prior order had considered an individual defendant’s statement that “white people do not have anxiety,” but concluded that the statement, even if problematic, did not establish a hostile environment or support an inference that painful and unnecessary procedures were imposed because of race, ethnicity, or religion.

Finally, the court rejected Wexler’s argument that he had a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged torture and the Fourth Amendment. It explained that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and that Wexler had not alleged that he was subjected to either. The court also rejected the argument that earlier orders were invalid because Judge Breyer later recused himself, stating that those orders were not void for that reason.

Disposition

Judge Ed M. Chen denied both Wexler’s motion for recusal and his motion for reconsideration. The order disposed of Docket Nos. 64 and 65.