Mayer v. HSBC Bank USA

Background

The court considered nine discovery disputes filed near the end of fact discovery: seven by Cory Mayer and two by the defendants. Mayer’s disputes primarily challenged the defendants’ claims that documents and communications were protected by attorney-client privilege. The defendants’ disputes concerned documents from third-party Argus Homes and a protective order concerning a former in-house lawyer.

The underlying litigation concerns allegations about the administration of a home loan and the parties’ 2020 settlement agreement. The opinion states that Mayer first sued the defendants in 2017, the parties litigated for three years, settled in 2020, and later litigated over alleged failures to carry out the settlement terms.

Attorney-Client Privilege

The court held that the defendants’ privilege logs supplied enough information to evaluate the privilege claims. The logs identified information such as preparation dates, general descriptions, subjects, purposes, authors, recipients, copied individuals, and the claimed basis for withholding the documents.

Mayer argued that the defendants’ lawyers were acting as business agents while the defendants serviced the loan, that the crime-fraud exception required disclosure, that the defendants waived privilege by relying on advice of counsel, that some communications did not include an attorney, and that the documents were important to his case. The court rejected these arguments.

The court concluded that Mayer had not shown that the communications could only concern loan servicing rather than legal advice. It also found that Mayer had not made the factual showing required for the crime-fraud exception, which can apply when an attorney is used to further a crime or fraud. The court found no facts supporting an advice-of-counsel defense that would waive the privilege. It further explained that privileged communications may include discussions among client employees about legal advice and that the importance of the documents to Mayer’s case did not eliminate the privilege.

The court stated that the result would be the same under federal privilege law. It also denied Mayer’s request for review of withheld documents because he had not provided the factual basis required for that review.

Rulings on Specific Discovery Submissions

The court denied the submissions at Docket Nos. 126, 127, 128, 129, and 142. These submissions sought, among other things, additional documents, additional depositions, and further production. The court additionally found that a second deposition of Ms. Pierre would not be proportional to the needs of the litigation and that the submission concerning Ms. Drexel repeated issues that could have been presented together with the Pierre issues.

The court stated that its rulings on Docket Nos. 126, 127, and 128 remained in place after reviewing supplemental materials concerning the defendants’ organizational deposition testimony at Docket No. 141. It found that Mayer’s materials did not support his contention that the defendants had misrepresented the scope or content of that testimony.

As to Docket No. 129, the court declined to reconsider earlier production rulings because the requests remained overbroad and disproportionate and Mayer identified no new facts or law supporting reconsideration. As to Docket No. 142, the court found that Mayer’s arguments largely repeated earlier disputes and denied the submission.

For Docket No. 140, the defendants sought a protective order concerning the deposition of Ms. Fantozzi, a former in-house lawyer who had represented PHH during negotiation of the 2020 settlement agreement. The court found that the deposition notice was untimely because it was served before discovery closed but scheduled for after discovery closed, and because Mayer had known of Fantozzi’s involvement early enough to provide timely notice. The opinion does not separately state a formal grant of the protective-order request.

For Docket No. 130, the court reviewed the defendants’ supplemental answers to interrogatories identifying personnel who took or directed certain actions concerning Mayer’s loan. The court found that the defendants had complied with the court’s prior instruction. Mayer’s remaining objections were characterized as issues suitable for cross-examination and did not warrant further discovery action.

For Docket No. 139, the defendants sought documents from third-party Argus Homes supporting Mayer’s damages claims. The court stated that, if the documents had not already been produced, they had to be produced within three business days of the order. The opinion states that the documents would include redactions previously allowed for third-party financial records.

For Docket No. 144, Mayer sought additional organizational deposition testimony on 31 of 61 noticed topics directed to PHH. The court found that the additional testimony was not proportional to the needs of the case. It also found that many disputed topics involved attorney-client privilege objections and that the remaining topics were largely tangential or demanded more detail than the defendants’ organizational-deposition obligations required. Mayer’s request for further testimony was denied.

Disposition and Classification

This was a discovery order rather than a decision on the underlying claims about the loan or settlement agreement. The court denied the specified discovery submissions, found the former counsel’s deposition notice untimely, found that the defendants had complied with the supplemental-interrogatory requirement, ordered conditional production from Argus Homes, and denied the request for additional organizational deposition testimony.

The opinion was signed by United States Magistrate Judge Susan Van Keulen on March 11, 2026.