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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled July 27, 2026

Bondi v. Blanche

Full caption

Carlos E. V. v. Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General; Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; David Venturella, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; David Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Eric Tollefson, Sheriff, Kandiyohi County

Judge
Laura Provinzino
Docket
0:26-cv-01618
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
8

Counsel5 of record
PETITIONER
Emeric J. Dwyer Chestnut Cambronne PA
Matthew Peter Yost Chestnut Cambronne PA
M. Boulette
RESPONDENT
Anthony Barrows DOJ-USAO
David W. Fuller United States Attorney's Office

Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.

ImmigrationHabeasCivil Procedure
In one sentence

Judge Provinzino denied Carlos E. V.'s motion to reopen his immigration detention case in Carlos E. V. v. Blanche, finding no extraordinary circumstances justified revisiting the court's earlier ruling.

Who this affects

Noncitizens held in ICE detention who seek to reopen prior habeas petitions based on dropped or downgraded state criminal charges, or based on injunctions entered in other cases. Also relevant to individuals with pending U-visa applications who are detained by ICE and wish to raise claims related to the ICWC injunction.

What happened

In Carlos E. V. v. Blanche, a noncitizen held in immigration detention asked a federal court to reconsider its earlier ruling that his detention was lawful. Carlos E. V. had originally been arrested on suspicion of first-degree assault, which led immigration authorities to detain him under a federal law requiring mandatory detention of noncitizens arrested for crimes causing death or serious bodily injury. He later sought to reopen the case, pointing to two changed circumstances: state authorities had dropped the assault charge in favor of a minor disorderly conduct citation, and a federal court in California had issued a preliminary injunction blocking certain immigration enforcement policies against people with pending U-visa applications — a category that includes Carlos E. V.

The court considered both arguments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment only in truly exceptional circumstances. On the dropped assault charge, the court explained that the lawfulness of immigration detention is determined at the moment a person is taken into federal custody — not by what happens to state charges afterward. Because Carlos E. V. was arrested for assault at the time ICE took custody of him, the later downgrade to a misdemeanor did not change the legal basis for his detention. On the California injunction, the court found that even if that injunction restored earlier immigration enforcement policies, those earlier policies still permitted immigration enforcement in 'exceptional circumstances,' and Carlos E. V.'s assault arrest could well have qualified. His claim that he would not have been detained without the now-blocked 2025 enforcement policies was too speculative to support relief.

Judge Laura M. Provinzino denied Carlos E. V.'s motion. The court made clear it was not deciding whether his pending U-visa application or prior grant of deferred action could independently limit the government's authority to detain him — Carlos E. V. had never raised those claims. The court noted that nothing prevents him from filing a new petition raising those issues on his own behalf.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Bondi v. Blanche · No. 0:26-cv-01618
Judge
Laura M. Provinzino
Date
July 27, 2026

Background

On January 29, 2026, Carlos E. V. was arrested in South St. Paul, Minnesota, on suspicion of first-degree assault based on reports that he stabbed someone. Dakota County initially held him, then transferred him to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) the next day. ICE detained him at the Kandiyohi County Jail.

On February 24, 2026, Carlos E. V. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (a court order requiring the government to justify a person's detention) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing his detention was unlawful. The government argued he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii), which requires detention of noncitizens who are arrested for, among other offenses, crimes resulting in death or serious bodily injury.

On March 18, 2026, the court denied the petition, holding that the detention determination is made at the moment ICE takes custody and that Carlos E. V. was, at that moment, arrested for a qualifying offense.

The Rule 60(b) Motion

On June 2, 2026, Carlos E. V. moved for relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief from a final judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief," but the Eighth Circuit has held that such relief is available only upon "an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances" and that Rule 60(b) is "not a vehicle for simple reargument on the merits." The court ruled Rule 60(b)(5) — which applies to judgments with ongoing prospective effect, like injunctions and consent decrees — inapplicable to the dismissal order at issue here, and analyzed Carlos E. V.'s motion solely under Rule 60(b)(6).

Carlos E. V. raised two grounds:

Ground One: Changed State Charges

Carlos E. V. argued that because state authorities never filed assault charges and instead, on May 19, 2026, cited him for disorderly conduct (a misdemeanor that does not trigger mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii)), he is no longer subject to mandatory detention.

The court rejected this argument, reaffirming its prior holding that amenability to mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) is assessed at the time ICE takes custody. Because Carlos E. V. was arrested for assault at the time of his transfer to ICE, the government was authorized to detain him. Dakota County's subsequent decision to downgrade the charges did not affect that determination. The court characterized this argument as an attempt to relitigate its prior legal conclusions, which is not a proper basis for Rule 60(b) relief.

Ground Two: The ICWC Preliminary Injunction

Carlos E. V. also argued that a preliminary injunction entered on May 20, 2026, in Immigration Center for Women & Children v. Noem (ICWC), No. 2:25-cv-09848-AB-AS (C.D. Cal.), entitled him to release. That case concerned a 2021 ICE directive instructing agents to generally defer immigration enforcement against individuals with pending U-visa applications (the "2021 Directive"), and a 2025 ICE guidance document that rescinded the 2021 Directive and replaced it with a presumption of enforcement (the "2025 Guidance"). The ICWC court found the 2025 Guidance arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act, and stayed it as applied to two preliminary classes: (1) individuals with pending U-visa petitions detained or sought to be detained for civil immigration enforcement; and (2) individuals granted deferred action based on a U-visa petition who were detained or removed without notice and an opportunity to be heard on revocation of deferred action.

Carlos E. V. argued he falls within both classes because he has a pending U-visa petition and received a grant of deferred action from USCIS in 2022, and that his arrest and detention occurred solely because of the now-stayed 2025 Guidance.

The court rejected this argument as "a bit of a stretch" for two reasons:

1. Even assuming the 2025 Guidance is invalid and the 2021 Directive is restored, immigration enforcement against U-visa petitioners was not prohibited under the 2021 Directive — it was permitted in "exceptional circumstances," including when a noncitizen poses an articulable risk of death, violence, or physical harm. The court noted that Carlos E. V.'s assault arrest may well have constituted such exceptional circumstances.

2. Carlos E. V.'s claim that he would not have been arrested and detained but for the 2025 Guidance was purely speculative. The court cited both a district court habeas precedent and the Supreme Court's decision in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), for the proposition that intervening legal developments alone rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

The court expressly declined to decide whether Carlos E. V.'s U-visa petition or deferred action status independently limits the government's authority to detain him, noting that Carlos E. V. never raised those claims in his original petition and had not, in fact, disclosed his U-visa petition or deferred action status at all in his original filing. The court stated that nothing prevents him from filing a new habeas petition raising such claims on his own behalf.

Disposition

Carlos E. V.'s Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From the Judgment (ECF No. 13) was denied.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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