Kemonou v. Minnesota Department of Revenue
- John Docherty
- 0:24-cv-04029
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 10
In Kemonou v. Minnesota Department of Revenue, Magistrate Judge Docherty denied plaintiff Richard Kemonou's motion to disqualify the magistrate judge, finding no legal or factual basis for recusal.
Parties who have had adverse rulings in a case and believe the judge is biased, particularly self-represented or pro se litigants who may seek to disqualify a magistrate judge based on the judge's critical comments about their conduct or arguments during proceedings.
What happened
In Kemonou v. Minnesota Department of Revenue (Case No. 24-CV-4029), plaintiff Richard Kemonou sued the Minnesota Department of Revenue and moved to disqualify the magistrate judge assigned to his case, claiming the judge was biased against him. Kemonou raised four arguments: that the court improperly attributed a bad motive to his lawsuit, that the court's criticism of his anti-Jewish statements amounted to religious and racial discrimination against him, that the court had prevented him from being heard on his damages, and that all these issues together required the judge to step aside.
The court applied the federal disqualification statute, which requires a judge to step aside when a reasonable person might question the judge's impartiality, or when the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against a party. The court found that its critical statements about Kemonou were based entirely on documents and events in the case record — including a written statement by Kemonou approvingly quoting Adolf Hitler and his conduct of asking deposition witnesses whether they were Jewish — not on any outside source of bias. The court also found that its statements did not rise to a level of deep-seated hostility that would make fair judgment impossible.
Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty denied Kemonou's motion, concluding that none of the four grounds, individually or together, provided the legal or factual basis required for disqualification. The court noted that the ultimate merits of the case will be decided by a jury and the assigned district judge, and that the court's decisions had been made by applying the law to the facts in the record.
The detailed version
- Kemonou v. Minnesota Department of Revenue · No. 0:24-cv-04029
- John F. Docherty
- July 30, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Richard S. Kemonou brought suit against the Minnesota Department of Revenue. The opinion does not detail the full merits of the underlying lawsuit, but indicates that Kemonou alleges racial and religious discrimination, and that four women complained he sexually harassed them. The ultimate merits of the case are to be decided by a jury and by the district judge, identified in the opinion as the Honorable Jerry W. Blackwell.
Kemonou moved to disqualify the magistrate judge (Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty) from the case. He had previously made the same request by letter dated July 8, 2026, which was denied the same day it was received. The present motion (Dkt. No. 164) is the formal follow-up to that letter request.
Legal Standard
The controlling statute is 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 455(a) requires a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Section 455(b)(1) requires disqualification per se when a judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
The court cited two controlling authorities: - Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994): opinions formed by a judge based on facts introduced or events occurring in the current proceedings do not constitute bias unless they display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism making fair judgment impossible. Critical, disapproving, or hostile judicial remarks ordinarily do not support a bias challenge unless they reveal an opinion derived from an extrajudicial (outside-the-record) source or reveal such a high degree of antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. - United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1017 (8th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Roads, 97 F.4th 1133, 1136 (8th Cir. 2024): a judge is presumed impartial, and the party seeking disqualification bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.
Kemonou's Four Grounds and the Court's Analysis
Ground 1: Alleged Improper Attribution of Motive
Kemonou argued that at an April 7, 2026 hearing, the court improperly attributed a personal and improper motive to his lawsuit by stating, in substance, that Kemonou was motivated by resentment over his dismissal from employment rather than by a genuine legal grievance. The court quoted its own statement from that hearing, in which it told Kemonou it believed he was bringing the lawsuit to inflict emotional pain and expense on the Department of Revenue and that his anger may be informed by prejudice against Jewish people.
The court found that those remarks were based on documents in the case record — specifically, deposition transcripts showing Kemonou repeatedly asking witnesses whether they were Jewish, and an email from Kemonou to opposing counsel that contained an approving reference to Adolf Hitler. Because the remarks were grounded in the case record rather than any extrajudicial source, and because they did not reflect deep-seated antagonism making fair judgment impossible, they did not meet the Liteky standard for disqualification.
The court also noted that the ultimate merits will be determined by a jury and District Judge Blackwell, not by the magistrate judge, who manages pretrial and non-dispositive matters.
Ground 2: Allegations of Discrimination by the Court
Kemonou argued that if he is antisemitic, then the court is "hateful, racist, and Islamophobic," apparently on the theory that criticizing anti-Jewish bigotry is inherently anti-Islamic. The court rejected this reasoning outright, stating that opposition to one form of bigotry is not bigotry of another kind in disguise. The court stated it had made no negative statements about Kemonou's race or religion, and that its condemnation was limited to Kemonou's anti-Jewish statements. The court observed that even in his memorandum accusing the court of bias, Kemonou expressed disdain for Jewish people. The court found no factual basis for this ground.
Ground 3: Alleged Denial of Opportunity to Be Heard
Kemonou claimed the court's condemnation of his anti-Jewish statements at the April 7 hearing prevented him from explaining his post-termination harm. The court reproduced a lengthy excerpt from the hearing transcript showing that after the court's admonition, Kemonou was permitted to speak at length about alleged stalking and harassment he attributed to powerful individuals associated with his lawsuit. The court found it "absurd" to claim he was prevented from being heard when the transcript showed he spoke for several minutes. The court also noted that the April 7 hearing was on the defendant's motion to compel discovery compliance — not a hearing on the merits of Kemonou's damages claims — so there was no procedural requirement to give Kemonou the opportunity to explain his damages at that hearing in any event.
Ground 4: Cumulative Effect
Kemonou argued that even if each ground individually fell short, their combined weight satisfied Section 455(a)'s reasonable-person standard for disqualification. The court rejected this argument as well, finding that because none of the individual grounds provided a factual or legal basis for disqualification, their aggregation did not either. The court stated that Kemonou's self-serving descriptions of the proceedings were inaccurate and reflected a misunderstanding of the law and its application to the documented record.
Disposition
Magistrate Judge Docherty denied Plaintiff's Motion for Disqualification of Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 164).
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.