Madrigal-Vega v. Director

Background

Jose Madrigal-Vega is a federal prisoner serving a 97-month sentence at the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth, Minnesota. He began serving his sentence on June 2, 2022, and his projected release date, absent any time credits, is July 2, 2030. On September 15, 2025, Madrigal-Vega — proceeding pro se (without a lawyer) — filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal statute that allows prisoners to challenge the legality of their imprisonment. He argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was miscalculating his time credits under the First Step Act (FSA) and the Second Chance Act (SCA), and he requested three forms of relief: (1) an order requiring the BOP to produce his time credit data; (2) recalculation of his sentence consistent with the FSA, SCA, and BOP guidance; and (3) transfer to a residential reentry center within 14 days of any corrected computation. Madrigal-Vega conceded in his petition that he had not pursued any administrative remedies before filing.

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on October 14, 2025, recommending denial of the petition on two grounds: (1) Madrigal-Vega failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief, and (2) he failed to demonstrate that the BOP was actually miscalculating his time credits. Madrigal-Vega timely objected to the R&R on October 22, 2025, raising five objections: that the R&R incorrectly treated mandatory credits as discretionary; that his future credit calculations were incorrectly handled; that the R&R failed to properly apply 18 U.S.C. § 3624's prerelease custody requirements; that exhaustion should be excused as futile and likely to cause irreparable harm; and that the R&R speculated about facts.

Standard of Review

Because Madrigal-Vega is proceeding pro se, the court applied liberal construction to his objections and conducted de novo (fresh, independent) review of the portions of the R&R to which he objected, consistent with Eighth Circuit guidance requiring courts to liberally construe general and conclusory pro se objections.

Holdings

1. Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Requested Relief

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Madrigal-Vega's claims because his requested relief — transfer to a residential reentry center — challenges only the conditions or location of his confinement, not the fact or length of his detention. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, federal courts have jurisdiction over habeas petitions that concern the fact or length of confinement, but not over claims challenging conditions of confinement. The court cited the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in Fortner v. Eischen, 170 F.4th 655 (8th Cir. 2026), which confirmed that prerelease custody (such as a residential reentry center) remains a form of detention, and that a claim seeking expedited transfer to prerelease custody is not cognizable (legally recognizable) in a habeas proceeding.

2. Unearned Time Credits

The court held that Madrigal-Vega could not prevail because he was seeking to apply FSA time credits he had not yet earned. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), FSA time credits are earned only upon completing evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities. Up to 12 months of earned FSA credits can reduce actual imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3); credits beyond that threshold are applied toward early transfer to prerelease custody. Because neither Madrigal-Vega nor the BOP could know whether he would complete those activities, he could not demonstrate that the BOP was improperly calculating his credits. The court also agreed with the magistrate judge that Madrigal-Vega's proposed credit calculations were erroneous.

3. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The court held that Madrigal-Vega failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that no exception applied. Federal prisoners must generally exhaust all available administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief under § 2241. This requirement is judicially created (not statutory), so a court has discretion to waive it, but the court declined to do so here. The court found that the institutional interests served by exhaustion — development of a complete factual record, benefit from BOP expertise, and allowing the agency to correct its own errors — were particularly compelling given the undeveloped record. The court was not persuaded by Madrigal-Vega's arguments that exhaustion would be futile or result in irreparable harm.

Disposition

Judge Tunheim overruled Madrigal-Vega's objections, adopted the R&R, denied the habeas petition, and dismissed the action without prejudice. The court's footnote explicitly states that dismissal without prejudice means Madrigal-Vega may refile if he can cure the jurisdictional and procedural defects identified in the opinion.