Thorne v. Scott D. Thorne and Christina M. Thorne

Background

The United States filed this lawsuit on November 26, 2025, under 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a), which grants federal courts jurisdiction to render judgments necessary for the enforcement of internal revenue laws. The government alleged that Scott D. Thorne and Christina M. Thorne jointly filed federal income tax returns for tax years 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, reported taxes owed on each return, but failed to pay the full amounts due. A delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury assessed the federal income tax, penalties, and interest for each of those years. As of the complaint filing date, the joint unpaid balance was $238,279.51, with interest continuing to accrue.

Separately, Scott filed an individual income tax return for 2023, again failed to pay the amount due, and was assessed an unpaid balance of $22,116.28 by a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury in late 2024. The IRS provided Scott notice and demanded payment; Scott did not pay.

Both defendants were served in December 2025. Scott's answer deadline was January 9, 2026; Christina's was January 12, 2026. Neither responded. The Clerk of Court entered default against both defendants on February 2, 2026, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) (which requires the clerk to enter default when a party fails to plead or otherwise defend).

The government moved for default judgment on April 22, 2026. The court issued an order warning the Thornes that continued failure to respond could result in default judgment. Scott, through retained counsel, filed a response on May 13, 2026, asking the court to deny the motion, set aside the clerk's entry of default, and grant him a two-week extension to file an answer. Christina never appeared. The court held a status conference on June 8, 2026, and attempted to locate Christina; an order sent to her last known address was returned undelivered. Christina still has not appeared.

Scott's Motion to Set Aside Default — Rule 55(c) Analysis

The court construed Scott's response as a motion to set aside the clerk's entry of default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), which permits a court to set aside an entry of default for "good cause." Courts in the Eighth Circuit apply a three-factor test: (1) blameworthiness or culpability of the defaulting party, (2) prejudice to the non-defaulting party, and (3) whether the defaulting party has a meritorious defense.

Factor 1: Blameworthiness

The court found this factor weighed against Scott. Scott appeared roughly four months after his answer deadline and over five months after the complaint was filed. Although courts have sometimes excused similar delays, Scott provided no compelling reason for his inaction. His claimed tendon injury in February 2026 could not excuse the initial three-week delay in responding before the injury occurred. His increased child-care responsibilities were noted sympathetically but did not fully excuse him from taking even minimal steps — such as contacting the court or retaining counsel — to address the lawsuit. Instead, Scott ignored the complaint and the clerk's default entry until the court itself ordered him to respond. The court characterized this as intentional conduct rather than a marginal failure, and noted that choosing to ignore litigation does not constitute excusable neglect.

Factor 2: Prejudice

This factor favored Scott. The court found no evidence that setting aside the default would cause concrete harm to the government — no loss of evidence, no discovery difficulties, no risk of fraud or collusion. The government identified only "unnecessary delay" as prejudice, which courts have held is insufficient on its own.

Factor 3: Meritorious Defense

This factor weighed strongly against Scott. To satisfy this factor, a defaulting party must proffer specific facts that, if believed, would support a defense. Scott's entire argument on this point was: "Defendant has viable defenses to Plaintiff's claims, including but not limited to dispute of a number of Plaintiff's allegations and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The court found this to be nothing more than bare legal conclusions unsupported by any facts, evidence, or elaboration. Scott's counsel offered no additional information at the status conference. The court held that failure to demonstrate a meritorious defense is, on its own, likely sufficient to deny relief from default.

Conclusion on Rule 55(c)

Balancing the three factors — Scott's partial culpability, the absence of prejudice to the government, and Scott's complete failure to identify any meritorious defense — the court declined to set aside the entry of default. The court reasoned that without any showing that a trial might produce a different outcome, setting aside the default would only delay the inevitable.

Default Judgment — Rule 55(b) Analysis

Having declined to set aside the default, the court turned to whether default judgment was warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). The court acknowledged that default judgments are disfavored and should be rare, but affirmed that courts have discretion to enter them when a party fails to defend.

Upon entry of default, factual allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted (except as to damages). The court must still confirm that the admitted facts establish a legitimate cause of action. Here, the government submitted certified IRS Forms 4340 — which courts in this circuit have held are sufficient to establish the validity of tax assessments — and the declaration of IRS Revenue Officer Jeffrey Turner. Neither defendant disputed the validity of the tax assessments. The court found the unchallenged facts constituted a legitimate cause of action under § 7402(a).

As to damages, the Turner declaration established that, as of March 30, 2026: - The Thornes' joint unpaid federal tax liabilities totaled $244,228.88. - Scott's individual unpaid federal tax liability totaled $23,306.69.

Because the amounts were calculable from the record, the court found no evidentiary hearing was necessary.

Disposition