Khan v. STATE OF NEW YORK

Background

Karen Khan and Kelly D. Shultes sued numerous federal, state, local, religious, corporate, and private defendants. After the court directed them to file an amended complaint and denied an earlier request for emergency relief without prejudice, the plaintiffs filed a renewed application under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

The plaintiffs principally sought to prevent Bank of New York Mellon from foreclosing upon or selling Khan’s residence. They also sought an order prohibiting defendants from enforcing what they described as a “counterfeit church.” The plaintiffs alleged that New York’s Religious Corporations Law, the church-autonomy doctrine, and federal and state tax provisions had established and protected that alleged church, which they said deprived women of personal autonomy and other constitutional rights. They represented that a hearing on the bank’s motion for foreclosure and sale was scheduled in New York Supreme Court, Dutchess County, on August 1, 2026.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy. A party seeking it generally must show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without the order, a favorable balance of the equities, and that the injunction serves the public interest. Irreparable harm must be actual and imminent, not remote or speculative.

To the extent the plaintiffs sought an emergency temporary restraining order without notice, the court held that they did not satisfy Rule 65(b)(1). They stated only that defendants “will be served,” did not identify efforts already made to notify Bank of New York Mellon, and did not explain why the bank could not be heard before the court acted.

The court also held that the plaintiffs had not shown immediate irreparable harm. They identified a hearing on the bank’s foreclosure motion, but not a scheduled foreclosure sale, eviction, transfer of title, or other injury that would occur before the bank could receive notice and respond.

The court further held that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions about the merits. Their submissions did not identify specific facts connecting the bank’s foreclosure proceeding to the Religious Corporations Law, the church-autonomy doctrine, or the challenged tax provisions. They did not explain what religious practice had been imposed on either plaintiff or how a religious organization directed or participated in the foreclosure proceeding.

The court also found that the plaintiffs’ allegations did not establish that Bank of New York Mellon, a private entity, acted under color of state law or jointly participated with a government defendant in violating their constitutional rights. The court said that general allegations of a conspiracy among the bank, government agencies, religious entities, and state courts did not substitute for facts connecting the bank’s conduct to an actionable constitutional violation.

Finally, the court held that the proposed order prohibiting defendants from “enforcing the counterfeit church” was insufficiently specific. Rule 65 requires an injunction to state its terms specifically and describe in reasonable detail the conduct being restrained. The plaintiffs’ proposal did not identify a particular act defendants would have to take or refrain from taking.

Disposition

Because the plaintiffs had not established irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits, or compliance with Rule 65’s notice and specificity requirements, the court did not separately address the remaining equitable factors. Judge Nelson S. Román denied the plaintiffs’ application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The court also declined to issue the plaintiffs’ proposed order to show cause. The opinion does not decide the ultimate merits of the plaintiffs’ underlying claims.