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S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled July 16, 2026

Montgomery v. Aviles-Ramos

Full caption

Tracy Montgomery, as Parent and Natural Guardian of LM., and Individually v. Melissa Aviles-Ramos, et al.

Judge
Koeltl
Docket
1:25-cv-06623
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
14
Civil ProcedureSummary Judgment
In one sentence

In Tracy Montgomery v. Melissa Aviles-Ramos, Judge Koeltl denied Montgomery’s summary-judgment motion, granted defendants’ motion, and ordered the complaint dismissed with prejudice.

Who this affects

Tracy Montgomery and I.M. could not obtain reimbursement for the disputed private-school expenses. The New York City Department of Education and Melissa Aviles-Ramos prevailed, and the complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

What happened

Tracy Montgomery sued the New York City Department of Education and Melissa Aviles-Ramos under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, seeking reimbursement for private-school tuition and related services for I.M. Montgomery challenged administrative decisions involving the 2019–20 and 2023–24 school years.

The court ruled that the 2019–20 claim was filed too late because Montgomery had received information about her rights and did not show that an exception applied. For 2023–24, the court ruled that the Department of Education did not have a duty to provide services before it learned that I.M. had returned to New York City, and that the fairness factors also did not support reimbursement. The court denied Montgomery’s motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants’ cross-motion, and ordered the complaint dismissed with prejudice.

Judge John G. Koeltl issued the ruling.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Montgomery v. Aviles-Ramos · No. 1:25-cv-06623
Judge
Koeltl
Date
July 16, 2026

Background

Tracy Montgomery sued the New York City Department of Education and Melissa Aviles-Ramos, in her official capacity as Chancellor of the Department of Education, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Montgomery brought the case individually and on behalf of I.M., a student with disabilities. She sought reimbursement for tuition, transportation, and nursing services connected to I.M.’s enrollment at the private International Institute of the Brain, referred to in the opinion as iBrain.

Montgomery challenged administrative decisions concerning two school years. For 2019–20, she claimed that the Department of Education failed to provide I.M. with a free appropriate public education and owed reimbursement for iBrain tuition. For 2023–24, she claimed that the Department had a duty to identify I.M., evaluate the student, and provide appropriate services after I.M. returned to New York City.

An Impartial Hearing Officer found that the 2019–20 claims were barred by the two-year filing deadline and that the Department did not have an obligation to provide a free appropriate public education for 2023–24. A State Review Officer upheld that decision and also found that the fairness factors did not favor reimbursement. Montgomery then filed this federal action. She moved for summary judgment, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

2019–20 reimbursement claim

The court held that the 2019–20 claim was time-barred. The parties agreed that the claim accrued in 2019 and that the applicable limitations period was two years. Montgomery argued that the period should be extended under an exception for situations in which a school agency withholds required information from a parent.

The court rejected that argument. It found that the Department provided a notice in November 2019 directing Montgomery to procedural safeguards available on its website, explaining how to obtain a physical copy, and giving basic information about challenging the education committee’s recommendations and requesting an impartial hearing. The court also noted that Montgomery attended education committee meetings in 2018 and 2019 and had not provided evidence showing that she was prevented from requesting a hearing or did not know, and should not have known, about that right.

The court therefore denied Montgomery’s motion for summary judgment on the 2019–20 reimbursement claim and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing that claim.

2023–24 reimbursement claim

The court also ruled against Montgomery on the 2023–24 claim. The court explained that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s “Child Find” requirement obligates school authorities to identify and evaluate children with disabilities. Under the standard applied by the court, a claimant must show that school officials overlooked clear signs of a disability, were negligent in failing to order testing, or lacked a rational justification for not evaluating the student.

The court found that the Department did not learn that I.M. had returned to New York City until June 2024, when iBrain contacted the Department about an education committee meeting. Before then, the Department believed that I.M. had moved out of state. The court found that Montgomery had not provided testimony or documentary evidence rebutting the Department’s position that it was unaware of I.M.’s return before June 2024. The court also found that Montgomery had not identified a regulation requiring the Department to take additional steps to locate I.M. under these circumstances.

Because the Department did not have an obligation to provide I.M. with a free appropriate public education for the 2023–24 school year, the court held that Montgomery was not entitled to tuition reimbursement for that year. The court independently concluded that reimbursement was also unavailable because the fairness factors did not favor Montgomery. In particular, the court found that she did not intend to enroll I.M. in public school, did not communicate with the Department before unilaterally enrolling I.M. at iBrain, and sought reimbursement only later.

The court denied Montgomery’s motion for summary judgment on the 2023–24 reimbursement claim and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing that claim.

Disposition

The court denied Montgomery’s motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. It directed the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice, close all pending motions, and close the case. Judge John G. Koeltl signed the order.

The authoritative version

Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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