Steve Rabin, et al. v. Google LLC

Background

This consumer class action concerns Google’s free “Google Apps Standard Edition,” later replaced by paid versions called G-Suite and Workspace. From 2006 through 2012, users could sign up for the Standard Edition. Google later stopped accepting new commercial users but allowed existing “legacy” users to continue using the Standard Edition for free until 2022.

In January 2022, Google announced that it would eliminate the Standard Edition for legacy users. Commercial users had to move to a paid Workspace subscription or download their data and end their accounts. Google later allowed certain non-commercial users to opt out, but did not offer that option to every user.

Steve Rabin signed up for the Standard Edition in 2009. After Google suspended his account in September 2022, he accepted the Workspace Agreement and paid between $17 and $50 per month for continued access. The operative complaint asserted breach of contract and claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law. The court had previously dismissed the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and certified a class of specified legacy users who were not eligible to opt out before being charged for Workspace.

Contract claim

The court granted Google summary judgment on Rabin’s breach-of-contract claim. Summary judgment is a decision entered when no genuine dispute over a material fact requires a trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court determined that the parties’ contract-interpretation dispute presented legal questions suitable for summary judgment.

The court interpreted the contracts’ “fees” provisions as referring only to the free Standard Edition, not to Google’s broader suite of business-productivity tools. Under the 2006–2011 version, Google promised to continue providing a substantially similar version of the Standard Edition free of charge if Google continued offering that service to the customer. The 2011–2012 version likewise stated that the Standard Edition was provided at no charge while allowing paid optional services or a premium version.

The court rejected Rabin’s argument that “the Service” meant all of Google’s business-productivity tools, including paid versions and later Workspace. The court relied on the agreements’ definitions, their use of “Service” and “Services,” and the way the agreements separately governed the Standard and premium editions. It also concluded that the fees provisions did not require Google either to provide the Standard Edition free to all users or to stop providing it to all users. The promise was user-specific: if Google continued providing the Standard Edition to a particular user, that user would receive it free.

The court also held that the contracts’ termination clause authorized Google to stop providing the Standard Edition to class members. That clause stated that Google could, at any time and for any reason, terminate the agreement or terminate the provision of all or part of the service. The court interpreted this language as allowing Google to stop providing the Standard Edition to an individual user without ending the service for everyone. The availability of paid Workspace did not change that conclusion because the court had already determined that Workspace was not “the Service” covered by the free-access promise.

Because the contracts authorized Google’s challenged conduct, the court did not need to decide Google’s alternative arguments concerning the contracts’ liability limitation, a possible 2012 contract modification, or Google’s defense that the later Workspace agreement replaced the earlier agreement. The court granted Google summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim.

Unfair Competition Law claim

The court also granted Google summary judgment on Rabin’s California Unfair Competition Law claim. The claim under the statute’s “unlawful” prong was based on the alleged contract breach and failed for the same reason as the contract claim.

The claim under the “unfair” prong also failed. To the extent it challenged Google’s termination of the Standard Edition, the court held that the contracts affirmatively authorized that conduct. The court stated that the “unfair” prong does not generally authorize courts to review the fairness of contracts where the challenged conduct is contractually permitted.

To the extent Rabin relied on allegedly misleading public statements by Google, the court held that he lacked standing. Standing is the legal requirement that a plaintiff show a personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct. The court found that Rabin had not provided evidence that he relied on the statements when using the Standard Edition. He testified that he could not identify statements that caused him to believe the service would be free for life and said he understood Google’s promise to be the one contained in the contract. Because the named plaintiff lacked standing on that theory, the court held that the class could not pursue those claims through him.

Other motions and sealing requests

Because Google prevailed on both class claims, the court denied as moot Rabin’s motion for partial summary judgment on certain affirmative defenses, Google’s motion to exclude the testimony of expert Jeffrey Fox, and Rabin’s motion to strike portions of Google’s reply supporting the expert-exclusion motion.

The court denied Rabin’s sealing motion concerning material designated confidential by Google because Google did not timely provide the required supporting statement or declaration. Rabin was ordered to file unredacted copies of the affected documents within seven days. The court denied as moot the parties’ earlier sealing motions concerning the summary-judgment and expert-related materials because those requests were later consolidated, and ordered the filing of unredacted copies of material not covered by the consolidated request.

The court granted the parties’ consolidated sealing motion. The approved redactions covered individual Google employees’ names and contact information, detailed internal financial and strategy information, and portions of Rabin’s deposition testimony concerning his business and information-technology expenses. The court found compelling reasons to protect that information from competitive harm.

Disposition

Google’s motion for summary judgment was GRANTED. Rabin’s motion for partial summary judgment, Google’s expert-exclusion motion, and Rabin’s motion to strike were DENIED as moot. The specified earlier sealing motions were DENIED as moot, Rabin’s unsupported sealing motion was DENIED, and the parties’ consolidated sealing motion was GRANTED.