Evans v. Clifton J. Lurkis

Background

Laurel Kristen Evans, a Georgia resident proceeding without a lawyer (pro se), filed suit in San Mateo Superior Court on March 10, 2026, against her former family-law attorneys. The defendants are two law firms — Madigan & Lewis, LLP and Lurkis Joyce & Del Bove, LLP — and three individual attorneys: Clifton J. Lurkis, Erin J. McCormick, and Kimberly A. Madigan. All defendants are California residents. Evans's complaint alleged three state-law claims: actual fraud, professional negligence/legal malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty, all arising from what she described as "two connected layers of attorney misconduct" in an underlying San Mateo County child-support and custody matter.

Procedural History of Service and Removal

After filing, Evans encountered several complications in serving the defendants. Defendants' counsel, identified as Ms. Choi, contacted Evans advising that service had not been completed and directed service to Madigan & Lewis. In early May 2026, Evans sought to arrange electronic service, but defendants' counsel requested that a process server complete service instead. On May 11, 2026, Evans learned her earlier summons had been rejected due to a name mismatch. She retained a process server by phone at 10:20 a.m. PT that day, resubmitted her corrected summons (accepted by the Superior Court at 3:48 p.m. PT), and planned for the process server to complete service on May 12, 2026. Before that could happen, defendants' counsel filed a Notice of Removal at 8:15 p.m. PT on May 11, 2026 — after the summons was issued but before service was accomplished. The removal was premised on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441.

Evans moved to remand on June 10, 2026. Defendants opposed on June 24, 2026, and Evans replied on July 1, 2026.

Legal Framework

Federal courts may hear cases removed from state court only if they would have had original subject-matter jurisdiction. The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, and doubts about removal are resolved in favor of remand. Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.

The "forum-defendant rule," codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), ordinarily bars removal based on diversity jurisdiction when any defendant who has been "properly joined and served" is a citizen of the state in which the action was filed. A "snap removal" is a removal filed by an in-state (forum) defendant before service is completed, allowing the defendant to claim the case is removable because the statutory bar only applies to defendants who have been "properly joined and served."

Holdings

Motion to Remand — Denied

The court found that all statutory requirements for removal were satisfied. First, complete diversity exists: Evans is a Georgia resident and all defendants are California residents. Second, the amount in controversy reasonably exceeds $75,000, based on Evans's allegation in her complaint that the underlying state court failed to account for approximately $10 million in undisclosed income associated with her former spouse. Third, defendants filed the Notice of Removal within the 30-day window required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.

The court then addressed the forum-defendant rule. Although the Ninth Circuit (the federal appeals court with jurisdiction over this district) has not expressly ruled on the validity of snap removals, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that it is "now common practice" for in-forum defendants in potential diversity actions to file removal notices before being served. The court further noted that at least three other federal circuit courts — the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits — have held that § 1441(b)(2), by its plain text, permits snap removals, even though such removals can work against the basic premise of diversity jurisdiction (protecting out-of-state litigants from local bias).

The court rejected Evans's argument that defendants' conduct constituted "strategic forum manipulation." The court found that defendants' counsel had simply notified Evans of her obligation to properly serve process under California law, and that there was no evidence of an attempt to mislead her. The court declined to craft an exception to the snap-removal doctrine based on the equitable argument that the purpose of diversity removal is to protect out-of-state defendants, not in-state ones — observing that courts routinely allow in-state defendants to remove based on diversity.

Motion to Stay — Denied

Evans asked the court to stay (pause) proceedings pending resolution of the remand motion and because of related state court proceedings. The court denied the stay request, finding it moot as to the remand issue (since the remand motion was denied) and unwarranted as to the state court proceedings. The court noted that a stay based on a parallel state case is appropriate only when the state case involves the same issues and same parties — which is not the case here, as the state court action involves Evans and her former spouse in a child-support dispute, while this federal case involves Evans and her former lawyers in a fraud and malpractice dispute.

Request for Costs and Expenses — Denied

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a court may award costs and expenses when remanding a case. Because the court denied remand, it also denied Evans's request for costs and expenses.

Significance

This ruling illustrates a contested area of removal law — the snap removal — where in-state defendants can avoid the forum-defendant bar by filing a notice of removal before being served. The opinion acknowledges the tension between the plain text of § 1441(b)(2) and the equitable purpose of diversity jurisdiction but follows the weight of circuit authority permitting the practice.