Rhodes v. Ford

Background

Kavin Maurice Rhodes, a state prisoner, brought this civil rights action against D. Ford under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute allowing individuals to sue state officials for constitutional violations. Rhodes's claims arise from his detention at Pelican Bay State Prison. After an earlier summary judgment ruling in Ford's favor was reversed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal, the case was remanded and Rhodes was permitted to file a Third Amended Complaint.

Rhodes's operative complaint asserted four claims, one of which — a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 — was voluntarily dismissed by stipulation. The stipulation expressly preserved the factual allegations underlying the remaining three claims. Those three remaining claims were: (1) First Amendment retaliation by filing a false rules violation report (a prison disciplinary document) on January 16, 2020, in retaliation for an inmate grievance; (2) First Amendment retaliation by arranging to have other inmates beat Rhodes on January 28, 2020, in retaliation for a grievance; and (3) Eighth Amendment violation by the same January 28, 2020 beating.

The Summary Judgment Ruling at Issue

Ford moved for summary judgment on claims (2) and (3). On July 10, 2026, the court granted that motion. Claim (1) — the false disciplinary report claim — survived and remains pending for trial, which is scheduled for October.

On summary judgment, the court applied the standard from Chaudhry v. Aragon, 68 F.4th 1161 (9th Cir. 2023), which holds that a defendant can be liable under § 1983 either through direct involvement or by directing, setting in motion, or conspiring with others to inflict a constitutional injury. Because Rhodes's complaint repeatedly characterized Ford's conduct as "conspiring" or "arranging" the attack, the court evaluated the evidence against that framing, as well as under the broader standard.

Ford submitted sworn declarations from himself and each of the four inmate attackers — identified in the opinion as Bridgewater, Davis, Anderson, and Williams — all stating that Ford had no contact with them and did not arrange the attack. Rhodes's contrary evidence consisted primarily of his own testimony that immediately before the attack, Ford made an unspecified gesture and pointed at him. The court found this evidence insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact, reasoning that a pointing gesture could not constitute "direction" of the attack without some prior agreement or communication — none of which was evidenced in the record.

The Present Motion

Rhodes moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify the July 10 order for interlocutory appeal (an appeal taken before a case is fully resolved), or alternatively under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for entry of final judgment on the dismissed claims, which would make them immediately appealable.

Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

Certification for interlocutory appeal is available only in exceptional circumstances and only where the moving party establishes: (1) a controlling question of law, (2) substantial grounds for difference of opinion on that question, and (3) that an immediate appeal may materially advance termination of the litigation. The standard is to be construed narrowly.

Rhodes argued the controlling question was whether a First Amendment retaliation claim requires proof of a conspiracy, or whether evidence of direction or joint action suffices. He contended the court had improperly imposed a conspiracy requirement.

The court rejected this characterization as incorrect. The court explained it evaluated conspiracy evidence only because Rhodes himself had alleged a conspiracy in his complaint. The court had also independently applied the Chaudhry standard — which does not require conspiracy — and evaluated whether Ford "arranged" the attack irrespective of any conspiracy theory. Under any formulation (directing, arranging, conspiring), the court explained, some evidence of collusion, coordination, or prior communication between Ford and the attackers is necessary. None existed beyond speculation.

The court also addressed Rhodes's reframing in the present motion of Ford's conduct as "directing" rather than "arranging." The court found this distinction unavailing for the same reason: a pointing gesture at the moment of the attack cannot constitute direction without prior communication conveying who the target was and obtaining the attackers' agreement — and there was no evidence of any such prior communication or opportunity for it.

The court concluded that Rhodes had not demonstrated a controlling question of law or substantial grounds for disagreement. The sufficiency of evidence to survive summary judgment is a factual question, not a legal one. The motion for interlocutory appeal certification was denied.

Entry of Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b)

Rule 54(b) allows a court to direct entry of final judgment on fewer than all claims if the court expressly finds there is no just reason for delay. Rhodes asked for this relief as an alternative to interlocutory certification.

The court denied this request as well. The case had been pending for more than six years. A trial is already scheduled for October. The court noted concerns about fading witness memories for both sides, particularly for the retired defendant. The first summary judgment order, entered April 23, 2024, was not reversed until approximately 15 months later, in July 2025 — illustrating the delay that would result from allowing an immediate appeal. Given the imminent trial date, the court found insufficient reason to delay further.

Disposition

The motion to certify the court's summary judgment order for interlocutory appeal and the alternative motion for entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) (Dkt. 201) were both denied. The hearing scheduled for August 20, 2026 was vacated. The case proceeds toward trial on the surviving First Amendment retaliation claim based on the allegedly false disciplinary report.