Court, Explained
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Back to docket
Procedural orderFiled Aug. 21, 2026

Kapur v. David Scott Cacchione

Judge
TLT
Docket
3:26-cv-02341
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
2
Civil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Kapur v. Cacchione, Judge TLT granted defendants Veepio Holdings and Ohliger's motion to set aside the clerk's entry of default to avoid inconsistent judgments among similarly situated defendants.

Who this affects

Defendants in civil cases who have had a default entered against them by the clerk — particularly where multiple defendants are alleged to have acted together — may be affected by this ruling's application of the Frow doctrine, which can allow a defaulted defendant to have that default set aside to avoid inconsistent outcomes across co-defendants.

What happened

In Kapur v. Cacchione (Case No. 26-cv-02341), plaintiff Ravi Kapur sued multiple defendants — including Veepio Holdings, LLC, Jonathan Ohliger, and David Scott Cacchione — alleging they acted in concert in various unlawful activities. After the clerk entered a default against Veepio and Ohliger (meaning those defendants had failed to respond in time and were recorded as having forfeited their right to contest the case), Veepio and Ohliger moved to have that default entry set aside.

The court applied a legal principle, known as the Frow doctrine, which holds that when defendants are alleged to have acted together, a court should not enter a final judgment against a defaulting defendant while the case is still being contested by other defendants — because doing so could produce contradictory results. For example, if the non-defaulting defendants win at trial, it would be unfair and inconsistent to hold the defaulting defendants liable for the same conduct. The court found this concern applied here, even if Veepio and Ohliger are not strictly jointly and severally liable with Cacchione, because inconsistent outcomes remained possible.

The court — whose judge is identified only by the initials 'TLT' in the signature block — granted Veepio and Ohliger's motion, vacated the clerk's entry of default against them, and cancelled the scheduled October 13, 2026, hearing. The court noted that Plaintiff Kapur has not yet filed a motion for default judgment, and that setting aside the default would not prejudice him, based on the parties' own joint status statement. The order does not resolve the separate entry of default against defendant Cacchione.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Kapur v. David Scott Cacchione · No. 3:26-cv-02341
Judge
TLT
Date
Aug. 21, 2026

Background

Plaintiff Ravi Kapur filed suit against multiple defendants — David Scott Cacchione, Veepio Holdings, LLC, and Jonathan Ohliger — alleging they acted in concert in various unlawful activities (the opinion references paragraphs 38–89 of what appears to be the complaint). After Veepio and Ohliger failed to respond in timely fashion, the clerk entered a default against them (ECF 13), which is a formal notation that a defendant has forfeited their opportunity to contest the claims by not responding. Veepio and Ohliger then filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (ECF 17).

On August 20, 2026, the parties filed a joint status statement (ECF 50) addressing both the Veepio/Ohliger default and the separate entry of default against Cacchione.

Legal Standard: The Frow Doctrine

The court applied the Frow doctrine, as recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re First T.D. & Invest., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2001), tracing back to the Supreme Court's decision in Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872). Under this doctrine, where a complaint alleges that defendants are jointly liable and one defaults, a court should not enter judgment against the defaulting defendant until the matter has been adjudicated as to all defendants. The rationale is to prevent inconsistent results: if the non-defaulting defendants prevail, the action should be dismissed against the defaulting defendants as well.

The Ninth Circuit has extended this rule beyond strictly joint-and-several liability to encompass defendants who are "similarly situated," when denying default judgment is necessary to avoid inconsistency.

Analysis and Ruling

The court identified three key factors supporting the motion:

1. Risk of inconsistent adjudication: The complaint alleges all defendants acted in concert. Even if Veepio and Ohliger are not strictly jointly and severally liable with Cacchione, inconsistent outcomes remain possible, triggering Frow doctrine concerns.

2. No pending motion for default judgment: Plaintiff Kapur had not filed a motion for default judgment against Veepio or Ohliger, meaning no final judgment was imminent in any event.

3. No prejudice to Plaintiff: Based on the parties' joint status statement (ECF 50 at 2–4), the court found that setting aside the entry of default would not prejudice Kapur.

The court granted Veepio and Ohliger's Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default, vacated the clerk's entry of default (ECF 13) as to Veepio and Ohliger, and vacated the hearing set for October 13, 2026.

What Remains Unresolved

The order expressly does not resolve the entry of default as to defendant Cacchione, which remains pending. The opinion's footer references a separate criminal case, United States v. Cacchione, No. 24-cr-00048-JD-1, but the court does not discuss any relationship between that matter and this civil case.

Note on Judge Identity

The judge's initials in the docket number and signature block appear as "TLT," but the full name is not clearly legible in the opinion text as provided.

The authoritative version

Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.