Powelson v. Havel
- Jon Tigar
- 4:24-cv-08245
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 6
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
In Powelson v. Havel, Judge Tigar dismissed four claims — malicious prosecution, a repackaged First Amendment claim, and a repleaded Monell claim — without leave to amend.
People who represent themselves in civil rights cases against government officials and agencies, particularly those who have had prior claims dismissed and are seeking to re-plead or cure deficiencies in subsequent amended complaints.
What happened
In Powelson v. Havel (Case No. 24-cv-08245-JST), Robbie Powelson, who is representing himself, sued Curtis Havel, James Malcolm, and the Richardson Bay Regional Agency, among others, over events in 2021 when he protested the seizure and destruction of houseboats. Powelson was arrested after intervening in one of those seizures, and the resulting criminal proceedings eventually ended in his favor. He brought claims including malicious prosecution and civil rights violations.
The court had previously dismissed several of Powelson's claims and given him a chance to fix them by filing an amended complaint. His malicious prosecution claims required him to show that defendants falsely reported facts to law enforcement to trigger his prosecution. Despite the opportunity to amend, Powelson still only alleged that defendant Havel reported to police that Powelson was interfering with Havel's official duties — which the court found was not a false statement of fact, even if Havel may have been acting beyond his proper authority. Two other claims were dismissed because Powelson essentially re-filed claims that had already been dismissed with prejudice: one was a First Amendment claim renamed as a Fourth Amendment claim, and another was a negligent training and supervision claim repackaged as a so-called Monell claim (a type of claim that a government entity had a policy or custom causing a constitutional violation).
Judge Jon S. Tigar dismissed Powelson's first, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action without leave to amend, meaning Powelson cannot refile these specific claims in this case. The court reasoned that because it had already given Powelson an opportunity to correct the deficiencies and he was unable to do so — and because two of the claims were simply re-labeled versions of already-dismissed claims — further amendments would not be appropriate.
The detailed version
- Powelson v. Havel · No. 4:24-cv-08245
- Jon Tigar
- Aug. 24, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Robbie Powelson, proceeding without a lawyer (pro se), has a history of protesting the displacement of individuals living on boats in the Richardson Bay area. On March 24–25 and May 25, 2021, Powelson protested what he characterized as the warrantless seizure and destruction of unoccupied houseboats by Curtis Havel, Harbormaster of the Richardson Bay Regional Agency (RBRA), and other defendants. On March 24, 2021, after Powelson intervened by kayak to halt the destruction of a houseboat, Havel called law enforcement and provided a statement about Powelson's activities. Powelson was arrested and later charged with obstructing official duties, interfering with a lawful business or property right, refusing to leave private property, and trespassing. According to Powelson's second amended complaint (SAC), the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor on April 25, 2024.
Powelson filed suit on November 21, 2024, and filed an amended complaint on February 28, 2025. The court had previously dismissed several claims without leave to amend (California's Bane Act; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 / First Amendment; negligence; negligent training, supervision, and retention) and dismissed other claims with leave to amend (malicious prosecution for March 24 and May 25 events; fabrication of evidence for May 25). The court denied dismissal of malicious prosecution based on the March 25 events. Multiple defendants were dismissed with prejudice in a prior order. Powelson then filed a second amended complaint (SAC), and the remaining defendants — RBRA, James Malcolm, and Curtis Havel — moved to dismiss his first, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action.
Legal Standard
The court applied the standard Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard: a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court accepted all factual allegations in the SAC as true for purposes of resolving the motion.
Malicious Prosecution (First and Third Causes of Action)
To state a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the prior action was commenced by or at the defendant's direction and terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (2) it was brought without probable cause; and (3) it was initiated with malice. Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019). The plaintiff must also show that the defendants prosecuted him for the purpose of denying a specific constitutional right. Critically, a private defendant is liable only if he or she "actively instrumentally" caused the prosecution — specifically, by falsely reporting facts to law enforcement. One who merely alerts law enforcement to a possible crime, where law enforcement independently decides to prosecute, is not liable.
The court had previously dismissed Powelson's malicious prosecution claims for March 24 and May 25, 2021 because he failed to plead that Havel and Malcolm falsely reported any facts to initiate his prosecution. Powelson argued that new allegations in paragraphs 20–25 of the SAC cured this deficiency. The court disagreed. While Powelson added allegations that Havel and Malcolm agreed to file a false police report, that Havel wished to cover up his actions, and that Havel was hostile toward Powelson, the court found these did not actually allege a false statement of fact. The sole factual allegation was that Havel told police Powelson was interfering with Havel's official duties under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). The court found this allegation materially indistinguishable from prior pleadings and reaffirmed its earlier reasoning: even if Havel exceeded his authority in seizing the houseboat, that does not establish that he falsely reported Powelson's conduct. Powelson was indeed at the scene and did intervene to stop Havel. The same deficiency existed as to the May 25, 2021 claims, which involved an already-dismissed defendant and thus could not support a malicious prosecution claim against the remaining defendants.
Because the court had already granted leave to amend once and the deficiency was uncured, it dismissed the first and third causes of action without leave to further amend, citing the broad discretion to deny further amendment when a prior opportunity has been given. Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999).
Exceeding Scope of Leave to Amend (Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action)
Fourth Cause of Action — Repackaged First Amendment Claim
Defendants argued that Powelson's fourth cause of action in the SAC — nominally a Fourth Amendment claim — was simply his previously dismissed First Amendment claim renamed. Powelson failed to address this argument in his opposition, which the court treated as an effective concession. The court independently compared the SAC's fourth cause of action with the First Amended Complaint's eighth cause of action and found they closely matched. Citing the principle that simply renaming a previously dismissed claim does not revive it, the court dismissed the fourth cause of action without leave to amend. The court noted that this claim had already been dismissed with prejudice.
Sixth Cause of Action — Repleaded Monell Claim
The court had previously dismissed without leave to amend Powelson's claim for negligent training, supervision, and retention as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. In the SAC, Powelson attempted to replead this claim as a "Monell claim" — a reference to Monell v. Department of Social Services, which allows plaintiffs to sue a government entity directly for constitutional violations caused by its official policies or customs. The court found this was the same previously dismissed claim restated under a different label. Because the claim was dismissed with prejudice, Powelson could not re-allege it. The sixth cause of action was dismissed without leave to amend.
Disposition
The court granted the partial motion to dismiss and dismissed Powelson's first, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action without leave to amend. The surviving claim — malicious prosecution based on the events of March 25, 2021 — was not addressed in this motion and remains pending.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.