Kyle D. v. Bisignano
- Shannon Elkins
- 0:25-cv-02781
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 10
In Kyle D. v. Bisignano, Judge Elkins remanded the disability-benefits decision because the administrative judge did not explain omitted interaction limits.
Kyle D. and the Commissioner of Social Security; the case returns to the Social Security Administration for further explanation of the interaction limits in Kyle D.’s work-capacity assessment.
What happened
In Kyle D. v. Bisignano, Kyle D. challenged the Social Security Administration’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The administrative judge found severe mood, anxiety, and gender-dysphoria impairments but concluded that Kyle D. could perform several jobs available nationally.
Kyle D. argued that the judge failed to explain why the work-capacity assessment included only “superficial” contact with others, rather than the medical opinions’ additional limits requiring contact to be “brief” and, for public contact, “infrequent.” The court agreed that the missing explanation could affect the jobs analysis and was not harmless.
Judge Elkins granted Kyle D.’s request for relief, denied the Commissioner’s request for relief, and remanded the matter to the Social Security Administration for further explanation about the required interaction limits. The order did not itself decide whether Kyle D. is entitled to benefits.
The detailed version
- Kyle D. v. Bisignano · No. 0:25-cv-02781
- Shannon G. Elkins
- Sept. 8, 2026
Background
Kyle D. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Kyle D. applied on April 10, 2023, alleging disability beginning that day. After the applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, an administrative law judge held a hearing on May 7, 2024, at which Kyle D., represented by counsel, and an independent vocational expert testified. The administrative law judge denied the applications on May 31, 2024, and the Appeals Council denied review on March 17, 2025.
The administrative law judge found severe mood, anxiety, and gender-dysphoria impairments. The judge determined that Kyle D. could perform a full range of work at all physical exertion levels, subject to limits including routine, repetitive, and three- to four-step tasks; adequate persistence and pace; and superficial contact with others. The judge found that Kyle D. could not perform past relevant work but could perform the jobs of store laborer, laundry worker, and janitor, which the vocational expert testified existed in significant numbers nationally.
Issue and Analysis
Kyle D. raised one challenge: the residual functional capacity, meaning the most work a person can perform despite limitations, did not properly address social-interaction restrictions. Kyle D. argued that the administrative law judge omitted the words “brief” and “infrequent” even though the judge found relevant psychological opinions persuasive.
Dr. Cremerius opined that Kyle D. was limited to occasional, brief, and superficial contact with coworkers and supervisors and should have no responsibility for serving the public directly. Dr. Boyd opined that Kyle D. could have brief and superficial contact with coworkers and brief, infrequent, and superficial contact with the public. The administrative law judge found Dr. Boyd’s opinion persuasive and Dr. Cremerius’s opinion partially persuasive.
The court explained that an administrative law judge does not have to adopt a medical opinion word for word. But the judge must clearly explain which limitations are included or excluded and support those decisions with evidence. Here, the administrative law judge did not explain why the residual functional capacity omitted “brief” and “infrequent” while using “superficial contact.” The court noted that “brief” concerns the length of an interaction, “infrequent” concerns how often it occurs, and “superficial” concerns the quality of the interaction. These differences could affect the vocational expert’s analysis of available jobs.
The court also rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the error was harmless. The omission could have changed the jobs analysis and, in turn, the disability decision. Because the court could not determine whether the omission was intentional, properly supported, or based on an improper combination of different terms, it found the error was not harmless.
Disposition
Judge Shannon G. Elkins ordered that Kyle D.’s request for relief was GRANTED and the Commissioner’s request for relief was DENIED. The matter was REMANDED to the Social Security Administration under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further explanation of whether the residual functional capacity should include limits requiring brief and superficial contact with coworkers and brief, infrequent, and superficial contact with the public. The order did not decide whether Kyle D. is ultimately entitled to disability benefits.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.