McCaffrey v. City of Richmond

Background

Jesse McCaffrey, who represented himself, sued the City of Richmond, the City of Richmond Police Department, Richmond City Manager Shasa Curl, Richmond Police Chief Bisa French, Wellsco Inc. doing business as Certified Towing, and Darrell B. Wells. His claims arose from the towing of a white Ford van on April 10, 2024. The City defendants moved for summary judgment on McCaffrey’s only remaining claim against them: his second cause of action alleging a violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The opinion states that the vehicle had previously received two notices for illegal parking and expired registration. Richmond Parking Enforcement Officer Tiara Gonzales caused the vehicle to be towed under California Vehicle Code section 22651(o). Richmond Police Department records indicated that an “Impound 126 mailer” was sent to McCaffrey after the tow. The mailer included a vehicle report and a notice of stored vehicle, but the department did not retain a copy of the latter document.

McCaffrey said he did not receive the notice of stored vehicle. He went to the Richmond Police Department the same day and requested a tow hearing, but said he never received follow-up. He also stated that an officer told him the vehicle could not be released until its registration was current.

Arguments and analysis

The court had previously allowed McCaffrey’s due-process claim to proceed as a claim under Monell, a legal doctrine that can make a local government responsible for a constitutional violation caused by its policy or practice. At summary judgment, the City defendants argued that the evidence did not show a pattern or practice of towing vehicles without notice. They also argued that the evidence showed they mailed McCaffrey notice and gave him an opportunity to be heard.

McCaffrey argued that there were genuine disputes of material fact about whether he received both required notice documents and whether he requested a hearing. He also argued that the circumstances of his case could show a systemic problem rather than an isolated employee action.

The court agreed that factual disputes existed about the process McCaffrey personally received. Specifically, the court identified unresolved questions about whether he received both parts of the mailer, whether he requested a tow hearing, and whether his conversation with the officer provided a sufficient opportunity to be heard. The court stated that some of these questions involved credibility determinations better left to a factfinder.

The court nevertheless held that the record did not support Monell liability. The City’s official policy of providing a tow hearing was not disputed. But, apart from his own interactions with the police department, McCaffrey presented no evidence that the failure to provide him with a formal hearing was part of a pattern or practice. The court concluded that the alleged failure to provide a document and hearing, without more, did not establish a City custom of towing and impounding vehicles without notice.

Ruling

Judge William H. Orrick granted the City defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The ruling concerned McCaffrey’s second cause of action against the City defendants. The opinion does not state that the order resolved the remaining causes of action against the Wellsco defendants.