Faison v. East Bay Regional Parks District
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:24-cv-06059
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 8
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate and have been consolidated across spelling variants.
In Faison v. East Bay Regional Parks District, Judge Corley ruled on trial-evidence motions and set procedures for the upcoming trial.
The order affects Deontae Charles Faison, the other Plaintiffs, East Bay Regional Parks District, the other Defendants, and the witnesses and trial participants in the scheduled trial.
What happened
In Deontae Charles Faison, et al. v. East Bay Regional Parks District, et al., the court addressed evidence and trial-management issues before the September 29, 2026 trial. The dispute involves evidence about the contents of the truck Plaintiff was in, his prior criminal history, Taser evidence, and Officer Knea’s conduct.
The court ruled that Defendants had not shown that the truck contents and criminal history were relevant to liability, but explained that some evidence could be relevant to whether Plaintiff fled to avoid arrest and to comparative negligence. Plaintiff may limit his direct examination of Dr. Schreiber, but Defendants may cross-examine him about Taser impressions if Plaintiff opens that subject. The court also limited Plaintiff’s negligence theory as agreed, declined to exclude Christina Vega’s testimony that wounds were consistent with Taser wounds, and barred her from testifying that a Taser caused those wounds.
Judge Jacquelyn Corley also set trial procedures, including 12 hours per side, eight jurors, and no separate liability-and-damages phases. The order required updated witness and exhibit lists and jury-instruction briefs by September 23, 2026, and scheduled another pretrial conference for September 24, 2026.
The detailed version
- Faison v. East Bay Regional Parks District · No. 3:24-cv-06059
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Sept. 17, 2026
Background
The court held a pretrial conference on September 15, 2026, before the scheduled September 29, 2026 trial. This order addressed the matters discussed at that conference; expert issues were addressed separately.
Evidence about the truck and prior criminal history
Plaintiff sought to exclude evidence about the contents of the gold F-150 pickup truck in which he was sitting when Officer Knea initiated the stop, as well as evidence of Plaintiff’s prior criminal history. The truck search uncovered six laptops, credit and debit cards, two pellet guns, a folding knife, and an unmarked bottle of buspirone hydrochloride pills. The opinion also states that Plaintiff was a convicted felon on felon probation, had missed a hearing, and had an active bench warrant.
Defendants argued that this evidence was relevant to Plaintiff’s motive, conduct, comparative fault, and the factual sequence of his flight. The court found that Defendants had not explained why Plaintiff’s motive for running was relevant to liability or identified a disputed fact that the evidence would resolve under the use-of-force analysis. The court also rejected Defendants’ reliance on Plaintiff’s past crimes, missed hearing, and theft-related conduct as evidence of negligence in the interaction with Officer Knea.
At oral argument, however, Defendants explained that the evidence could be relevant to comparative negligence because it could show that Plaintiff fled to avoid arrest and custody and therefore continued fleeing longer than he admitted. The evidence could counter an argument that Plaintiff fled because he feared the Taser rather than because he sought to evade arrest. The court directed the parties to discuss whether they could stipulate to certain facts to reduce unfair prejudice. The opinion does not state a single express grant-or-denial disposition for these combined motions.
Dr. Schreiber’s Taser testimony
Plaintiff sought to prevent his emergency-medicine expert, Dr. Schreiber, from discussing Tasers, electronic conducted weapons, and neuromuscular incapacitation. During his deposition, Dr. Schreiber stated that he did not think Plaintiff had been successfully tased and that Plaintiff’s actions did not match his expectations of a successful Taser connection.
The court ruled that Plaintiff could limit the scope of his own direct examination and therefore did not need to ask Dr. Schreiber about those subjects. If Plaintiff introduced Dr. Schreiber’s impressions of the Taser use, Defendants could cross-examine him and refer to his deposition testimony if needed for impeachment.
Limits on the negligence theory
Defendants sought to limit Plaintiff’s negligence theory to Officer Knea’s conduct up to and through the Taser deployments. Plaintiff agreed that he would not argue that Officer Knea was separately negligent for failing to enter the water, rescue Plaintiff, or provide or obtain medical care. Plaintiff did intend to introduce Officer Knea’s testimony about why he did not enter the water, arguing that the testimony concerned the circumstances and environment in which Knea chose to use force. The court agreed that this testimony was relevant to the reasonableness of the use of force.
Plaintiff’s courtroom presence
Defendants sought to exclude Plaintiff from the courtroom except when he appeared for identification by the jury. Plaintiff’s counsel represented that Plaintiff would attend the beginning of trial and possibly closing arguments, but not every trial day. Defendants stated that they had no objection based on that representation.
Christina Vega’s testimony
Defendants sought to exclude treating nurse Christina Vega’s opinion that marks on Plaintiff were caused by a Taser. They argued both that Plaintiff’s witness disclosure was inadequate and that Vega formed the opinion after treatment rather than during treatment.
The court found that any deficiency in the required witness disclosure was harmless because Defendants knew about Vega’s opinion through an investigator’s report and references in Dr. Vilke’s report. The court also rejected the substantive exclusion argument to the extent it relied only on the absence of a contemporaneous reference to a Taser in hospital records. The court stated that this issue could be explored through cross-examination.
The court nevertheless ruled that Vega was not qualified to testify that the wounds were caused by a Taser. If Plaintiff laid a proper foundation, she could testify that the wounds she observed were consistent with other wounds she had seen that she knew were caused by Tasers.
Trial procedures
The court limited each side to 12 hours to present its case, excluding opening and closing arguments. Eight jurors would be selected, and all eight would deliberate. The court declined to divide the trial into separate liability and damages phases.
The parties were to receive completed jury questionnaires by September 23, 2026. During jury questioning, each side would have 30 minutes to question the prospective jurors orally. The court planned to tell jurors that they should be available through October 9, 2026. The order listed trial sessions from September 29 through October 7, 2026.
Further proceedings and disposition
The parties were ordered to meet and confer about trial and evidentiary stipulations, exhibit objections, and witness lists. By September 23, 2026, each side had to file revised witness and exhibit lists, any stipulations reached, and a brief concerning disputed jury instructions. The court scheduled another pretrial conference for September 24, 2026, by Zoom, to discuss agreed-upon juror excusals and remaining exhibit and witness issues.
The order states that it disposes of Docket Nos. 129, 130, 138, 139, 140, and 141. It was signed by Judge Jacquelyn Corley on September 17, 2026.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.