Green v. County of Orange

Background

Tammi Green, formerly detained at the Orange County Correctional Facility, sued the County of Orange and named and unnamed jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits claims for violations of federal rights by state or local officials, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. She alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments based on the forced removal of her hijab for booking and identification photographs, confiscation or destruction of religious items during cell searches, denial of religiously compliant meals during Ramadan, and retaliation for complaints about jail conditions.

The County Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legally plausible claim. The motion was partial. It did not challenge Green’s First Amendment free-exercise claim or failure-to-intervene claim against Conca, Palmer, Sedita, Narcise, or Gessner. The court also noted that the John Doe defendants had not been identified or served and were not part of this motion.

Claims Against the County

The court dismissed without prejudice Green’s Section 1983 municipal-liability claim against the County. Green relied on a theory that the County had a widespread practice of requiring religiously observant people to remove religious head coverings for photographs. The court held that the complaint did not provide enough concrete detail about the other alleged incidents, did not give dates or approximate periods for them, and did not plausibly show that the County knew about and accepted such a practice. The court did not decide that the number of alleged incidents was categorically insufficient; it concluded that the allegations lacked adequate factual support.

The court also dismissed without prejudice the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim against the County. Both sides treated that claim as dependent on the same municipal-policy, custom, or practice theory, and the court held that the complaint failed for the same reason.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The court dismissed without prejudice Green’s March 2025 meal allegations and April 1, 2025 cell-search allegations for failure to exhaust available jail grievance procedures before filing suit. The complaint alleged that Green filed grievances about those events but did not allege that she appealed either grievance through the required process. The April grievance was still pending when she filed the lawsuit. The court rejected Green’s argument that her favorable decision on a separate grievance about pork-derived cereal excused her from appealing the different March 4 meal grievance.

Sergeant Mullins

The court dismissed the complaint as to Mullins, without prejudice. The March 2025 meal allegations against him were part of the unexhausted claims. The separate failure-to-intervene allegation against him identified no specific incident, violation, or opportunity to intervene and therefore did not plausibly state a claim. Because no viable claim against Mullins remained, the First Amended Complaint was dismissed in its entirety as to him.

Retaliation Claims

The retaliation claim concerning the August 20, 2024 search survived as to Gessner but was dismissed without prejudice as to Narcise and Lattimer. Green alleged that she complained directly to Gessner about recreation time and that he later said, “the next time you want to quote the law at me, you should know that I am the law in here.” The court held that these allegations plausibly connected Gessner’s knowledge of the complaint to the search.

The court dismissed the same retaliation claim as to Narcise and Lattimer because Green alleged only on information and belief that they learned about her complaint. The complaint did not provide facts supporting that belief. The court also dismissed without prejudice Green’s retaliation claim against Narcise concerning the January 18, 2025 search because it did not plausibly allege that Narcise knew about the grievance that Green claimed motivated that search.

The retaliation claim concerning the April 1, 2025 search was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The court did not reach the merits of that claim.

Failure to Intervene

The court dismissed without prejudice the failure-to-intervene claim against Lattimer. Green alleged that Lattimer participated in the August 20 search but did not plead facts showing that he knew about her earlier complaint or therefore understood that the search was allegedly retaliatory. The court concluded that the complaint did not plausibly show that Lattimer perceived a constitutional violation or had a realistic opportunity to stop it.

The court had already dismissed the failure-to-intervene claim against Mullins as part of dismissing the complaint against him. The failure-to-intervene claims against Conca, Palmer, Sedita, Narcise, and Gessner were not challenged and remained pending.

Fourth Amendment Reference

The court denied as moot the request to dismiss a supposed Fourth Amendment claim. It found that “Fourth” appeared only in the heading of the claim and that the allegations did not assert an unlawful search or seizure. The court treated the reference as a drafting error and construed the claim as a Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-intervene claim based on alleged First Amendment violations. That claim was dismissed as to Mullins and Lattimer but was not otherwise challenged in the motion.

Free-Exercise Claim Against Lattimer

The court denied the motion as to Green’s free-exercise claim against Lattimer. The complaint alleged that Lattimer helped remove Green from her cell, refused her request to put on her hijab, and monitored her while the search occurred. The court held that these allegations described Lattimer’s own conduct and adequately alleged his personal involvement at the pleading stage.

Disposition

The County Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The dismissed claims were dismissed without prejudice, and Green was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint by September 28, 2026. The court stated that if she did not amend by that date, the claims dismissed without prejudice would be deemed dismissed with prejudice. The court denied the motion as to Lattimer’s free-exercise claim and Gessner’s retaliation claim concerning the August 20, 2024 search. The non-moving defendants were required to answer or otherwise respond by October 19, 2026.