Beltran v. FCA US LLC

Background

Martin Beltran and Paul Gioffre sued FCA US LLC over alleged tracking on FCA’s ecommerce websites. The complaint alleged that the websites used third-party cookies and similar technologies to transmit user data even after visitors opted out of non-essential cookies. According to the complaint, the tracking could allow third parties to collect website interactions and shopping behavior, build profiles, and support targeted advertising. Terry Dean Meyers had voluntarily dismissed his claims.

The plaintiffs asserted invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion claims (Counts I and II); California Invasion of Privacy Act claims under California Penal Code sections 631(a), concerning wiretapping, and 638.51(a), concerning pen registers (Counts III and IV); common-law fraud (Count V); and unjust enrichment (Count VI).

FCA moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, and under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to state legally sufficient claims.

Standing and Privacy Claims

The court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded Article III standing. They alleged that they visited FCA websites, selected the option to opt out of cookies except essential cookies, and nevertheless had their personally identifiable information and website activity collected by third-party tracking technologies. The court concluded that these allegations sufficiently pleaded harm such as an intrusion into private matters or unjust enrichment.

For Counts I and II, the court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a highly offensive intrusion into matters they reasonably expected to remain private. The allegations that FCA designed its websites with third-party tracking capabilities, knew how the collected data would be used, and used the data for its own advertising purposes were sufficient at the pleading stage to allege knowing and intentional conduct.

The court also stated that any privacy theory based on alleged misrepresentations was subject to Rule 9(b), which requires fraud-based allegations to be stated with particularity. Those misrepresentation-based portions of Counts I and II were dismissed with leave to amend.

California Invasion of Privacy Act Claims

The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly pleaded the Section 631(a) wiretapping claim under an aiding-and-abetting theory. It also held that the Section 638.51(a) pen-register claim was plausibly pleaded. The complaint alleged that third parties received Internet Protocol addresses and other routing or addressing information and used it in real time to identify and record the starting and ending points of communications. The court further found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged separate processes for collecting communication content and signaling information.

Fraud Claim

The court dismissed Count V, the fraud claim, with leave to amend. It found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that FCA’s statement that visitors could opt out of all third-party cookies except necessary cookies was false, that FCA knew the statement was false, and that the plaintiffs were harmed. But the complaint did not specifically allege when each individual plaintiff visited the website and encountered the alleged misrepresentations, as Rule 9(b) required.

Unjust-Enrichment Claim

The court rejected FCA’s challenge to Count VI. FCA argued that the plaintiffs had not shown that they lacked an adequate legal remedy. The court found the complaint sufficient at the pleading stage because it alleged that FCA profited from data it wrongfully acquired and that the plaintiffs had no adequate legal remedy to recover those profits. FCA had not provided a specific argument explaining how the plaintiffs could seek the alleged profits through a legal remedy.

Disposition

Judge Rita F. Lin granted in part and denied in part FCA’s motion to dismiss. The motion was granted in part as to Count V and as to Counts I and II only to the extent those counts were based on a misrepresentation theory. It was denied in all other respects. Because the court could not conclude that amendment would be futile, the dismissed portions were dismissed with leave to amend. Any amended complaint was due by October 13, 2026, and could not add new claims or parties or change the allegations beyond correcting the identified deficiencies without permission or agreement under Rule 15. If an amended complaint was filed, FCA’s response was due November 2, 2026; otherwise, FCA’s answer to the existing complaint was due that date.