S.G. v. San Francisco Unified School District

Background

S.G., a minor student, alleges that Donavan Eagle Harper, a teacher at the San Francisco Unified School District, sexually abused her. She also alleges that the District failed to take timely action to intervene and remedy the effects of the alleged harassment. S.G. alleges severe emotional and psychological distress, including moderate to severe anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder, and asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The parties were conducting discovery. The District moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 to compel S.G. to attend a medical examination. S.G. had already undergone a psychological evaluation and testing by her expert, Dr. Stacy Cecchet. The District sought a psychiatric examination by Dr. Anlee Kuo and a psychological evaluation by Dr. Sarah Hall. S.G. agreed to Dr. Kuo’s psychiatric examination but objected to the additional psychological testing by Dr. Hall.

The parties had initially disagreed about neuropsychological testing, which concerns functions such as memory, perception, problem-solving, and motor function. The District clarified that it was not seeking neuropsychological testing, so the court did not address that issue.

Rule 35 standard

Rule 35 allows a court to order a party to undergo a physical or mental examination when the party’s condition is genuinely involved in the case and the requesting party shows good cause. Good cause requires specific facts showing that the requested examination could produce information relevant to the claim and necessary to the requesting party’s case.

S.G. agreed that her mental condition was generally involved in the case and that good cause supported Dr. Kuo’s psychiatric examination. The court separately examined whether the District had shown good cause for Dr. Hall’s psychological testing. It concluded that the testing could provide information about the validity of S.G.’s diagnosis and symptoms and the scope and severity of her alleged injuries. The court also found that Dr. Hall’s testing would provide information not available through Dr. Kuo’s psychiatric examination because Dr. Hall would administer and interpret psychological tests. The court credited the District’s assurance that S.G. would not be required during that testing to relive the alleged trauma, discuss her alleged victimization, or discuss the underlying events.

Scope of permitted testing

The District proposed four tests: the Memory Validity Profile, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Adolescent, the Personality Assessment Inventory-Adolescent Version, and the Rorschach Performance Assessment System.

The court granted the motion to compel as to the Memory Validity Profile. It noted that S.G. had not made a specific objection to that test beyond her general objection to psychological testing.

The court permitted one personality test, with the choice left to the District. It denied permission to administer a second personality test. The court relied on the conflicting opinions of the experts, the fact that S.G.’s expert had administered only one personality test, and the need to consider the burden of testing on S.G.

The court denied the motion as to the Rorschach test. It cited the conflicting expert opinions, the reported infrequency of the test in forensic assessments, and the need to limit the burden of additional testing on S.G.

Scheduling and disposition

The court directed that Dr. Kuo’s psychiatric examination and Dr. Hall’s psychological testing occur on separate days. It reasoned that the examinations could require up to approximately eleven total hours if conducted together and that this would likely be too much for one day. The dates and times were to be chosen by the District after consultation with S.G.’s counsel, with any timing disputes brought to the court.

The court therefore granted in part and denied in part the District’s motion to compel. It granted the motion as to the Memory Validity Profile and one personality test of the District’s choosing; denied it as to a second personality test and the Rorschach test; and ordered the psychiatric and psychological examinations to occur on separate days. The order disposed of Docket No. 119.