Hamilton v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A.

Background

Arthur C. Hamilton represented himself in this action against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A., Old Republic Default Management Services, and Shirley Franklin. He alleged that the defendants fraudulently evicted him from his home and took possession of the property while making the transaction appear to be a simple trustee’s sale. His complaint asserted four causes of action: fraudulent use of the process; fraudulent transfer, fraudulent conversion, and violation of antifraud Rule 10b-5; fraudulent alienation and fraudulent inducement; and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On July 15, 2019, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), concluding that the claims were barred by res judicata. Res judicata, also called claim preclusion, generally prevents a party from bringing the same claims again after a final judgment. The court found that Hamilton had previously filed a separate action involving the same parties, alleged facts, and causes of action; the apparent difference was the signature date. The earlier action had also been dismissed with prejudice.

At the time of the dismissal in this case, none of the defendants had been served. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A., was served more than three weeks later, on August 9, 2019. The court stated that the defendants were not expected to respond to Hamilton’s motion because two had never been served and the bank was served only after the case had already been dismissed.

Motion for Relief from Judgment

Hamilton moved for relief from the judgment and permission to reopen the case. The court construed the motion as arising under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b) permits relief from a final judgment for specified reasons, including mistake or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, a void judgment, satisfaction of the judgment, or extraordinary circumstances. The court noted that dissatisfaction with an order or a belief that the court made a mistake is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for relief.

Hamilton first argued that the case had been closed prematurely because he did not understand the applicable rules and procedures. The court treated this as an argument based on mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). It rejected that argument, explaining that the complaint was dismissed because it should not have been filed again, not because of Hamilton’s lack of understanding.

Hamilton also referred to a magistrate judge’s allegedly inaccurate handling of the case. The court stated that this action had never been assigned to a magistrate judge and assumed that Hamilton was referring to the earlier-filed case. The court found that issue irrelevant to this action and noted that the earlier case had been dismissed after Hamilton repeatedly refused to comply with the undersigned judge’s orders.

Finally, Hamilton made general statements that the case was not frivolous and that the defendants had relied on delays. The court found that these assertions identified no newly discovered facts or evidence and no extraordinary circumstances that could justify relief.

Disposition

The court concluded that none of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) was present and that Hamilton’s claims had always been barred by claim preclusion. It therefore denied the Motion for Relief from Judgment and Permission to Reopen Case. The ruling addressed only whether the prior judgment should be set aside or the case reopened; it did not conduct a new merits determination of Hamilton’s underlying allegations.