De Paz Sales v. Barr

Background

Josep De Paz Sales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court proceeding challenging the legality of a person’s detention. He had been detained at Yuba County Jail since July 2018 while removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act were pending. He sought immediate release or a new bond hearing.

An Immigration Judge initially denied bond in August 2018, finding that Sales was a danger to the community. Sales later moved for a new bond hearing based on developments including completion of his high school diploma, substance-abuse classes, continued sobriety, counseling plans, support from a caseworker, and possible participation in an alcohol-monitoring program. The Immigration Judge denied that request, concluding that the changes were not material to the original danger finding.

Exhaustion

The government argued that the court should not review the petition because Sales had not completed his administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The court explained that exhaustion—completing available administrative review before seeking relief in court—is generally required as a prudential matter, but may be excused when further administrative proceedings would cause irreparable harm.

The court excused exhaustion here. Sales had been detained since July 2018, and the appeal could take several more months. The court also considered the psychological and emotional effects he described from continued detention and the conditions at the jail, including being held indoors nearly 24 hours a day. The court concluded that requiring him to remain detained while awaiting the administrative appeal would cause irreparable harm.

Due Process and Prolonged Detention

The court held that Sales’s detention had become prolonged and that due process required another bond hearing. It relied on the fact that he had been detained for more than 14 months and was likely to remain detained for several more months. The court also considered that he was held in a penal institution under conditions resembling confinement, that his immigration detention exceeded the time he served for his criminal convictions, and that a six-month delay resulted from the Immigration Judge’s failure to explain an earlier decision rather than from Sales’s actions.

The court applied the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge: the person’s private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation under existing procedures and the value of additional safeguards, and the government’s interest and the cost of additional procedures. The court found that Sales’s interest in liberty was strong, the value of another hearing was high, and the government had not identified significant costs associated with providing one. The court therefore concluded that due process required another bond hearing.

Legal Error in Applying the Changed-Circumstances Standard

The court separately ruled that the Immigration Judge committed legal error in denying a new hearing based on changed circumstances. Under the applicable regulation, a person may obtain a new bond hearing by showing that circumstances have materially changed since the prior bond decision. The court said the Immigration Judge improperly placed the burden on Sales to prove that he was not a danger to the community. Instead, the government had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was a flight risk or danger to the community to justify continued detention.

The court also found that the Immigration Judge addressed the ultimate question of whether Sales remained dangerous rather than deciding whether his circumstances had materially changed. The court held that this was not the correct legal standard.

Disposition

The court granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the government to provide Sales with another bond hearing within 21 days. At that hearing, the government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that Sales is a flight risk or danger to the community to continue detaining him. The court expressly found that Sales had not shown entitlement to immediate release.