Dixon v. Berryhill

Background

Terrance Dixon sought judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income. He alleged physical and mental impairments stemming in part from gunshot injuries, including chronic pain, fecal incontinence, asthma, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, psychotic disorder, paranoia, insomnia, and cognitive limitations. The administrative law judge found that Dixon had not engaged in substantial gainful activity, had severe impairments including substance abuse and asthma, but had no severe mental impairment. The administrative law judge found that Dixon could perform work at all exertional levels with restrictions involving pulmonary irritants, social interaction, workplace changes, and simple work-related decisions. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the administrative law judge found that Dixon could perform jobs such as hand packager, laundry laborer, and warehouse worker and therefore was not disabled.

Dixon moved for summary judgment, arguing that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated the medical evidence, should have obtained testimony from a medical expert, improperly rejected his symptom testimony, and assessed his residual functional capacity incorrectly. The Commissioner opposed Dixon’s motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge failed to provide legally adequate reasons for rejecting Dr. Franklin’s and Dr. Schnurr’s opinions. The explanation that Dr. Franklin’s opinion was uninformed or misleading because it did not discuss the effects of Dixon’s drug use did not explain how that past drug use undermined the opinion. The court also found that the administrative law judge’s statement that Dr. Schnurr was the only evaluator to identify cognitive deficits misstated the record because other providers had noted memory, confusion, concentration, or cognitive difficulties.

The court further held that the administrative law judge erred by failing to address Dr. Watson’s opinion that Dixon could stand or walk for less than two hours and sit for less than six hours in an eight-hour workday. The court could not rely on explanations offered later by the Commissioner because judicial review was limited to the reasons the administrative law judge actually gave.

The court found these errors harmful rather than harmless. Proper consideration of the opinions could affect the evaluation of Dixon’s mental impairments, his testimony, his residual functional capacity, and the later steps determining whether he could perform past or other work. The court therefore did not affirm the administrative law judge’s decision on the existing record.

The court rejected Dixon’s argument that the administrative law judge had a duty to obtain medical-expert testimony. The record contained reports from multiple providers, state-agency consultants, a vocational expert, and Dixon’s treatment history, and the court found no sufficient showing that the record was ambiguous or inadequate. The court also upheld the administrative law judge’s reasons for assigning little or no weight to the opinions of Dr. Graves-Matthews, Ms. Fenton, and Dr. Kennedy. In addition, it found that the administrative law judge gave clear and convincing reasons for finding Dixon’s asthma-related statements not entirely consistent with the evidence, including evidence that his asthma improved with treatment and that physical examinations were largely normal. However, the court found that the mental-impairment portion of the credibility analysis required reevaluation because it relied substantially on the improperly rejected medical opinions.

Disposition and remand instructions

The court granted in part and denied in part Dixon’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. It remanded the action for further administrative proceedings rather than ordering an immediate award of benefits. On remand, the administrative law judge must reevaluate Dr. Franklin’s and Dr. Schnurr’s opinions using the applicable legal standard, address Dr. Watson’s opinion, reassess Dixon’s credibility and mental residual functional capacity if those opinions cannot properly be rejected, and revisit the determinations at the fourth and fifth steps of the disability analysis. The court expressed no opinion on the ultimate merits of Dixon’s benefits application. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. directed the clerk to close the case.