Bell v. Williams

Background

Vincent Keith Bell filed a self-represented civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court had dismissed an earlier pleading while allowing him to amend, and it reviewed Bell’s second amended complaint under the federal prisoner-screening statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Bell also moved for a default judgment.

Bell alleged that, while he was in custody at San Francisco County Jail # 2, sergeant Williams told him to move cells. Bell questioned the move, but later agreed, packed his belongings, and sat in his wheelchair with his hands raised. Williams called deputies to conduct a cell extraction. Bell alleged that the deputies removed him from his wheelchair and made him hop on one leg to a safety cell, even though a wheelchair was immediately available. Bell said he fell, suffered sharp pain and extreme physical exertion, and was then dragged to the safety cell. He alleged that deputies stripped him and left him there for 24 hours.

Bell alleged that captain Fisher, the jail’s watch commander, had to approve safety-cell placements and that he was not a threat to himself or others. He also alleged that the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department failed to train employees on transporting physically disabled inmates and failed to provide an assistance device needed because of his above-the-knee amputation.

Screening and Due-Process Claims

The court explained that a § 1983 claim requires an alleged violation of a constitutional or federal-law right by someone acting under state law. Because Bell was apparently a pretrial detainee, the court evaluated his confinement-condition allegations under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Conditions of pretrial detention may not amount to punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution.

The court held that the second amended complaint stated a cognizable § 1983 due-process claim against sergeant Williams based on making Bell hop a substantial distance on one leg and then having him dragged when he could not continue. The court also held that the complaint stated a cognizable due-process claim against Williams and captain Fisher based on placing Bell in the safety cell for 24 hours while apparently unclothed.

The court did not find a § 1983 claim against the City and County of San Francisco or the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department merely because those entities employed the alleged wrongdoers. It also rejected Bell’s municipal-liability claim based on failure to train. The court stated that Bell identified only this one incident and had previously alleged that the defendants had been trained but disregarded existing policies. The court dismissed that claim without leave to amend.

Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act Claims

The court explained that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibit disability discrimination in a public entity’s programs, services, or activities. The court further explained that the public entity responsible for the alleged discrimination is the proper defendant for these claims; Title II does not provide a claim against a public official in an individual capacity.

The court held that, liberally construed, Bell’s allegation that the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department failed to provide a transportation assistance device stated cognizable claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

Disposition and Case Management

The court concluded that Bell could proceed with § 1983 due-process claims against sergeant Williams and captain Fisher and with Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims against the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department. It dismissed all other claims and defendants.

The court ordered the clerk to issue summonses and directed the United States Marshal to serve the second amended complaint and the order on the listed defendants without requiring Bell to prepay fees. It set deadlines for defendants’ dispositive motions, Bell’s opposition, and any reply. The order also permitted discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and gave Bell procedural warnings about responding to a future summary-judgment motion.

Judge Susan Illston denied Bell’s motion for a default judgment because no defendant had been served when Bell filed the motion, so no defendant had missed a deadline to respond.