Fanaro v. County of Contra Costa

Background

Jearhamel Jordan Fanaro alleged that five inmates attacked him while he was a convicted inmate at the Martinez Detention Facility. He alleged that four unidentified deputies enabled or failed to stop the attack, including by allowing gang members to control part of the facility, failing to address staffing and camera problems, and failing to intervene. He also alleged that the County of Contra Costa, the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff David O. Livingston knew about inadequate training, supervision, staffing, and security but failed to act.

Fanaro asserted 15 claims against various defendants. The County, the Sheriff’s Office, and Livingston moved to dismiss the nine claims against them. Fanaro separately moved to strike the answer filed by Thomas Leon, one of the alleged attackers.

County-policy and individual-capacity claims

Fanaro brought five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute that allows claims against state or local actors for constitutional violations. His claims against the local government were based in part on Monell liability, which can apply when a government policy, custom, practice, or failure to train causes a constitutional injury.

The court held that Fanaro had alleged enough facts at the pleading stage to proceed with his county-policy and failure-to-train theories. The court pointed to allegations that County defendants assigned inmates based on gang membership, allowed gang members to control parts of the facility, knew about understaffing and camera blind spots, and failed to correct those problems. The court also held that the Sheriff’s Office could be sued under § 1983 and that Fanaro had adequately alleged claims against Livingston in his individual capacity. The motion to dismiss the Monell claims was denied.

Fourteenth Amendment claims

Fanaro alleged that the defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him from the inmate attack. Because the complaint described Fanaro as a convicted inmate, the court concluded that these failure-to-protect claims could not proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process theory. Fanaro argued that he intended to pursue an equal-protection theory based on race, but the complaint did not clearly allege such a violation and its racial allegations were insufficient.

The court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claims with leave to amend. It stated that any amended equal-protection claim would need plausible allegations that the defendants acted intentionally and discriminatorily.

Injunctive relief

Fanaro sought an order preventing the County defendants and unidentified deputies from continuing or repeating the challenged policies and practices. The court held that he lacked standing—a legal requirement that a plaintiff show a real and immediate risk of injury—to seek an injunction because the complaint said he had been released from the County jail. The possibility that he might be incarcerated and assigned to a gang unit again was too speculative.

The court dismissed the claims for injunctive relief against the County with prejudice, meaning those claims could not be refiled in this case.

State-law claims

Fanaro brought state-law claims for failure to protect, racial discrimination under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, state-created danger, and negligence. The court held that California Government Code section 844.6(a)(2) generally immunizes a public entity from liability for injuries to a prisoner or injuries caused by a prisoner. Because Fanaro sought compensatory and punitive damages and lacked standing to seek an injunction, the court dismissed these claims against the County and the Sheriff’s Office with prejudice.

The court also dismissed the state-law claims against Livingston with prejudice. Fanaro’s government tort claim identified the attack and the alleged failures of the deputies on duty but did not mention Livingston or anyone in a supervisory role. The court held that adding claims against Livingston in the complaint was a complete shift in the allegations and that amendment would be futile.

Motion to strike

Fanaro asked the court to strike Leon’s answer, arguing that it did not meet pleading requirements and that its defenses lacked factual support. The court denied the motion, explaining that striking the answer would likely accomplish little and that Fanaro could use other discovery methods to obtain information about Leon’s defense.

Disposition

The County defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part. The motion to dismiss the Monell claims was denied. The Fourteenth Amendment claims were dismissed with leave to amend. The state-law claims against the County, the Sheriff’s Office, and Livingston were dismissed with prejudice, and the claims for injunctive relief against the County were dismissed with prejudice. Fanaro’s motion to strike Leon’s answer was denied. The court set October 30, 2019, as the deadline for Fanaro’s amended complaint. Judge William H. Orrick signed the order.