Mary Gustafson v. City of San Jose

Background

The court had previously ordered Mary Gustafson to amend her complaint and gave her instructions about the deficiencies that needed to be corrected. Gustafson filed an amended complaint on October 28, 2019. The court stated that the amended complaint still failed to state a plausible claim for relief.

The original complaint concerned a $35,600 citation issued by the City of San Jose for code-enforcement violations involving an allegedly unpermitted sunroom. The amended complaint no longer focused on that citation amount and instead sought punitive damages, quoted in the order as “$1000,000.” Gustafson alleged that the City was pursuing the citation for revenue, that she was being singled out and discriminated against, and that her civil rights were being violated because no other homes had been cited.

The amended complaint was written as a long letter and included attachments consisting mainly of letters and other documents. It was addressed to “City of San Jose Mayor Sam Lacardo,” while also mentioning “Alan Lipton.” The court construed the possible claims as applying only to Mayor Sam Liccardo and San Jose City Attorney Alan Lipton.

Screening and Possible Claims

Because Gustafson had been allowed to proceed without paying the filing fee, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. That screening requires dismissal if a complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. The court also applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires a short and plain statement of jurisdiction, the claim for relief, and the requested relief.

The court considered whether Gustafson had stated a civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such a claim requires allegations that a person acting under state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal right. The court found that Gustafson’s statements that she had been singled out, discriminated against, and had her civil rights violated were conclusory. The amended complaint did not identify the constitutional right involved, explain why the alleged singling out violated the Constitution, or connect Liccardo or Lipton to the alleged violations. The court therefore found that no § 1983 claim had been adequately pleaded.

The court also considered a possible fraud claim based on Gustafson’s statement that the housing citation was “trumped up.” It found that the amended complaint did not allege all required fraud elements, including that Liccardo or Lipton knew the citation was false, intended to defraud Gustafson, that she justifiably relied on a misrepresentation, or what damages resulted from that reliance.

Jurisdiction and Disposition

The court found that the amended complaint still did not state a basis for federal jurisdiction. Although a properly pleaded § 1983 claim could provide federal-question jurisdiction, the court found that claim inadequately pleaded. The court also stated that diversity jurisdiction did not seem to exist because the parties appeared to be California residents, while noting confusion about whether Gustafson was a Florida citizen or resided in California. Independently, the court found that Gustafson had not followed the instruction to include the grounds for jurisdiction in her amended complaint.

The court concluded that Gustafson had failed to correct the deficiencies identified in the earlier orders, despite multiple opportunities, detailed instructions, assistance opportunities, and an extended deadline. Judge Edward J. Davila ordered that Gustafson’s claims be dismissed with prejudice and directed the clerk to close the file. The order was a screening and pleading-based disposition rather than a decision on the merits of the housing citation or discrimination allegations.