Drevaleva v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs

Background

Tatyana Evgenievna Drevaleva, proceeding without a lawyer, brought an employment action against Robert Wilkie, identified as the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. She alleged that a West Los Angeles Veterans Affairs Medical Center did not hire her because of sex and pregnancy, age, or disability. She also asserted that the defendants intentionally caused her emotional distress and requested punitive damages.

Drevaleva had previously worked for about six weeks at a New Mexico Veterans Affairs Medical Center before traveling to Russia. She was later terminated for being absent without authorization. In 2018, she applied for positions at Veterans Affairs facilities in Minneapolis and West Los Angeles. The Minneapolis facility rescinded a tentative offer after learning about her earlier termination. The West Los Angeles facility did not offer her a position after an interview in which she said she would need additional time off to return to Russia for medical follow-up. She did not tell the facility during the interview that the trips involved in-vitro fertilization or pregnancy.

Drevaleva pursued the Equal Employment Opportunity process and later filed this lawsuit. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also considered additional facts raised in her opposition brief, even though such new allegations ordinarily are not considered at this stage.

Discrimination claims

The court applied the standard for a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to make relief legally plausible.

For sex and pregnancy discrimination, the court found that Drevaleva alleged that she belonged to a protected group and was rejected for a job, but did not allege facts showing that she was sufficiently qualified to support an inference of discrimination. The court noted her admission that she scored substantially lower than other applicants and that her earlier termination could have been a reason the interviewers considered her unqualified. The fact that men were hired instead of her was not enough. The court also found that the facility did not know during the hiring decision about her attempts to become pregnant or her intended pregnancy-related time off. The sex and pregnancy discrimination claim was dismissed.

For age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the court found that Drevaleva alleged only that she was 51 when she applied. The court said her allegations were conclusory and did not plausibly show age discrimination, particularly because the younger applicant she identified had scored higher in the interview. The age-discrimination claim was dismissed.

For disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, the court found that Drevaleva did not identify a qualifying disability or show that she was otherwise qualified for the employment. The court also found that her statements about needing to return to Russia for follow-up did not adequately suggest that the facility denied her a reasonable accommodation because of a disability. Those claims were dismissed.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

The court analyzed this claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. It held that the emotional-distress claim arose from the same facts as the discrimination claims and that Title VII provided, if at all, the exclusive remedy. The court therefore held that the claim was preempted from district-court review and dismissed it.

Punitive damages and defendant identity

The court agreed that punitive damages were unavailable for Drevaleva’s Title VII, Rehabilitation Act, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims. Her request for punitive damages was denied as moot.

The court also held that the Department of Veterans Affairs was an improper defendant for these federal employment-discrimination claims. It explained that the proper defendant is the head of the agency or department and dismissed the Department of Veterans Affairs as a defendant. The court directed the parties to use the caption reflected in the order going forward.

Disposition

The court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. It denied further leave to amend because it had considered the additional facts Drevaleva presented in her opposition brief. The order therefore dismissed the claims and ended the action as pleaded.