Wilkins v. County of Contra Costa

Background

Keenan G. Wilkins, a state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning his detention at Martinez Detention Facility. The court had previously vacated pending motions and allowed Wilkins to file a third amended complaint containing the claims he wanted to pursue.

Because Wilkins was a prisoner suing governmental defendants, the court conducted the required preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. At this stage, the court had to identify claims that could proceed and dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also applied the rule that a complaint must allege enough facts to make relief plausible, while construing a self-represented plaintiff’s allegations liberally.

Claims Allowed to Proceed

The court allowed the following claims to proceed:

- Due process: Wilkins alleged that he was held in administrative segregation for eight months for unknown reasons, without due process, and that he was denied participation in periodic reviews. He also alleged that the conditions were unusually severe. The court found these allegations sufficient against Livingston, Vanderlind, Vannoy, and Wilson. - Conditions of confinement and exercise: Wilkins alleged that he lived in a small, unsanitary cell containing trash that attracted rodents and that he was not given adequate cleaning supplies. He also alleged that he was denied exercise from February through August 2013 and again from August through October 2013. The court found these allegations sufficient against Livingston, Vanderlind, and Vannoy. - Equal protection: Wilkins alleged that some prisoners received due process, outdoor exercise, television access, and legal materials while others did not. Construing the allegations liberally at the screening stage, the court allowed this claim to proceed against Livingston, Vanderlind, Vannoy, and Wilson. - Access to the courts and legal materials: Wilkins alleged that he submitted a state case concerning the conditions described in his complaint and submitted original exhaustion documents, but defendants did not allow him to make photocopies. He alleged that he later could not prove exhaustion because he no longer had the originals, and that his case was dismissed. He also alleged that he and other prisoners were denied photocopying and materials such as pens. The court found these allegations sufficient against Livingston, Vanderlind, and Vannoy. - Retaliation: Wilkins alleged that Engalstad moved him to a cell without a television because Wilkins had filed complaints with the County Supervisors. He alleged that later cell assignments also lacked a television view and had other problems. The court found this claim sufficient to proceed.

Claims Dismissed

The court dismissed the medical-privacy claim with prejudice. Wilkins alleged that he had to discuss medical matters with medical personnel through his cell door, allowing other prisoners to hear the conversation. The court said he had not specifically identified what information was overheard or shown that it involved a fundamental right, and concluded that he had not identified a viable federal claim.

The court also dismissed the claim against the county with prejudice. To hold a local government liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a government policy or custom caused the constitutional injury; the government is not liable merely because an employee allegedly caused the injury. The court found Wilkins’s allegations about county policies, customs, and inadequate training conclusory because he did not describe the specific policy, custom, or training failure or provide supporting facts.

Further Proceedings and Disposition

The court stated that the case would continue on the claims and against the defendants identified above. It allowed discovery and said no additional court order was needed before the parties could conduct discovery. The court stated that it would not review motions to compel when the requested discovery had not first been sought from defendants, and would not consider late discovery or motions to compel.

The court ordered defendants to file a summary-judgment motion or another dispositive motion no later than 91 days after service, unless defendants informed the court that summary judgment could not resolve the case. Wilkins would have 30 days to respond, and defendants would have 15 days to file a reply if they chose to do so. The court also warned Wilkins that he was responsible for prosecuting the case, must report address changes, and could face dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Bottom Line

This was a screening order, not a final decision on whether Wilkins would ultimately win. The court permitted several constitutional claims to move forward, dismissed the medical-privacy and county-policy claims with prejudice, and established procedures for discovery and later dispositive motions.