Liaw v. United Airlines, Inc.

Background

The case arose under the Montreal Convention, an international treaty governing airline liability for international passenger travel. On October 27, 2018, Liaw was traveling on United Flight 931 from Chicago to London when an outer layer of the cockpit windshield cracked. The plane made an unscheduled landing in Goose Bay, where it remained on the tarmac for eight hours before Liaw continued traveling.

Liaw alleged that the plane descended faster than usual and that the descent caused minor lower-back soreness. He also alleged nightmares and other mental injuries from the incident. He was the only passenger who claimed an injury. He did not seek medical attention for his back until about ten months after the flight and four days before his deposition. An MRI later showed an annular fissure and disc bulge.

The parties agreed that the cracked windshield was an unexpected or unusual event external to Liaw and therefore qualified as an “accident” under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention. The dispute was whether that event caused Liaw’s back soreness. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and both sought to exclude evidence offered by the other side.

United’s Motion to Exclude Liaw’s Expert

Liaw relied on Dr. Moshe Lewis, who concluded that a rapid descent created forces that caused the disc injury. The court applied Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the reliability requirements for expert testimony. It found that Dr. Lewis was qualified to identify causes of lower-back injuries but was not shown to be qualified to evaluate the aerodynamic forces acting on a passenger during the flight’s descent.

The court also found a significant analytical gap between the evidence and Dr. Lewis’s conclusion. His research involved flight crews, astronauts, and helicopter pilots rather than passengers on a single commercial flight. He was unaware of literature addressing whether one commercial-flight descent could cause the type of injury Liaw alleged. The court further found that his causation reasoning rested largely on the fact that two unusual things—the unscheduled landing and Liaw’s later soreness—occurred, which showed correlation rather than causation. United’s motion to exclude Liaw’s expert testimony was GRANTED.

Liaw’s Motion to Exclude United’s Evidence

Liaw sought to exclude evidence that United allegedly failed to disclose during discovery and sought to exclude United’s experts under Rule 37. The court denied those requests. It found that Liaw raised his discovery complaints too late, had not previously asked the court to intervene, and had not shown meaningful prejudice.

The court rejected Liaw’s complaint that United failed to preserve or produce the flight-data-recorder information. The opinion states that the data was recorded over because the incident was not reportable to the National Transportation Safety Board and no injury had been reported at the time. The court also found that FlightRadar24 data used by United’s experts was publicly available, known to Liaw, and available to him throughout the case.

The court allowed United’s expert reports concerning descent rates and biomechanics, finding that they addressed the same issues raised by Liaw’s expert and did not unfairly surprise him. The court also rejected Liaw’s authentication and hearsay objections to the FlightRadar24 data as untimely and unpersuasive. Liaw’s motion to exclude United’s evidence was DENIED.

Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

The court held that Liaw lacked admissible evidence that the cracked windshield, the descent, or the landing caused his back soreness. United’s evidence indicated that the descent and landing were controlled and within normal parameters. United’s experts found no unusual maneuvering or heightened loading, and the flight crew stated that the descent and landing were not atypical.

The court found that Liaw’s subjective recollection of a rapid descent was insufficient by itself to create a genuine dispute of material fact. It also found that his causation theory shifted during the briefing: he initially relied on a rapid descent but later argued that the unexpected windshield crack and subsequent soreness were enough. The court concluded that the evidence required too much speculation to connect the windshield crack to the alleged bodily injury.

The court explained that emotional-distress damages under the Montreal Convention required the bodily-injury predicate at issue here. Because Liaw failed to establish that an accident caused bodily injury, the court stated that the Montreal Convention did not cover his alleged mental injuries. The court expressly stated that it did not need to decide whether mental injuries unrelated to bodily injury could otherwise be recovered under the treaty.

United’s motion for summary judgment was GRANTED, and Liaw’s motion for summary judgment was DENIED.

Motions to Seal

Liaw’s request to seal Exhibit F to the Gaw declaration was DENIED because United did not file the required supporting declaration. His request to seal specified portions of Exhibit A, containing information about his emotional state, was also DENIED.

Liaw’s request to seal specified portions of Dr. Lewis’s report was GRANTED as to pages 5–6, 15, and 24–25, and otherwise DENIED. His request concerning the same report in connection with United’s motion to exclude was GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART to the same extent.

United’s motion to seal portions of Liaw’s deposition and his Olympic Club records was GRANTED to the extent supported by Liaw’s declaration and otherwise DENIED. The parties were ordered to file unredacted versions of the documents at issue by November 27 at noon, subject to the redactions allowed by the order.

Disposition

The conclusion states that United’s motions for summary judgment and to exclude Liaw’s expert testimony were GRANTED, while Liaw’s motions for summary judgment and to exclude United’s evidence were DENIED. Judgment was to follow.