Prescott v. Santoro

Background

A California jury convicted Earnest L. Prescott of first-degree murder and found a firearm-discharge enhancement applicable. The conviction arose from the June 6, 2010 shooting death of James Johnson. Prescott was tried jointly with Jason Jones; the jury convicted Prescott and acquitted Jones. Prescott was 16 at the time of the shooting, according to the facts described by the California Court of Appeal, and he was incarcerated when he filed this federal petition.

After his conviction, Prescott appealed and sought state post-conviction relief. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and summarily denied his state petition, and the California Supreme Court denied review. In federal court, Prescott raised three claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal statute allowing a state prisoner to seek relief when custody violates the Constitution or federal law.

The Letters and the Three Claims

Prescott’s claims concerned two letters. An unsigned 2011 letter apologized for blaming “lil Earn” and said that “Poony” was responsible. A 2012 letter, signed by Jones, confessed to the murder and stated that Prescott was not involved. A handwriting examiner initially retained by Prescott’s trial lawyer could not determine whether Jones wrote the letters. After sentencing, Jones told an investigator that he wrote both letters and that he, rather than Prescott, shot Johnson. Jones later made a sworn declaration repeating those statements. A later handwriting expert retained during state proceedings concluded that a competent examiner could identify Jones as the author.

Prescott’s first claim alleged that Jones’s confessions were not introduced at trial and established Prescott’s actual innocence. He argued that the California Court of Appeal should have required the State to respond to his state petition under California decisions governing state habeas procedures. He also argued that the state court violated due process by summarily denying the petition. Prescott disclaimed bringing a freestanding actual-innocence claim.

His second claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that trial counsel should have continued investigating the letters after the first handwriting examiner reached an inconclusive result.

His third claim alleged a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Prescott argued that he should have been allowed to question Laquisha Williams about her testimony in an unrelated murder trial because that evidence would have shown that she had lied to police in that case.

First Claim: State Habeas Procedures and the Letters

The court denied relief on the first claim. It explained that the California decisions Prescott relied on concerned California law and procedures for state post-conviction petitions. Alleged errors in applying state law generally do not provide a basis for federal relief under § 2254.

The court also rejected Prescott’s reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma. Hicks involved a defendant’s federal due-process right to have a jury exercise sentencing discretion provided by state law. The court found no comparable denial of a statutory right here. It understood the California Court of Appeal’s summary denial to mean that the court found Prescott had not presented a prima facie case for relief, rather than that the court had denied him a federally protected procedural right.

The court further found that cases involving actual innocence as a way to overcome a procedural default did not support Prescott’s claim because procedural default was not at issue. The first claim therefore did not warrant relief.

Second Claim: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The court denied the ineffective-assistance claim. Under Strickland v. Washington, a petitioner must show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Under § 2254, federal review is highly deferential when a state court has already rejected the claim.

The court concluded that the California Court of Appeal was not unreasonable in rejecting Prescott’s claim. The record showed that David DeGarmo, the initial handwriting examiner, had substantial experience and training. Counsel gave DeGarmo the letters and additional handwriting samples, including 21 more pages from Jones. DeGarmo then reported that he could not reach a conclusion because of variations and differences in the writings.

The court found it reasonable for counsel to rely on that qualified expert’s inconclusive analysis and not continue the investigation. DeGarmo had not indicated that further investigation would help or requested additional information. The federal court therefore held that the state court’s rejection of the ineffective-assistance claim was not unreasonable. The second claim was denied.

Third Claim: Cross-Examination

The court denied the Confrontation Clause claim. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, but not cross-examination to the full extent the defense prefers. Trial judges may impose reasonable limits based on concerns such as confusion, undue delay, prejudice, witness safety, or cumulative evidence.

Williams had told police that Prescott carried a gun after returning to the car and said Jones had wanted to shoot but Prescott “ran up on the dude.” At trial, she said she did not remember seeing a gun and that her earlier statements were not really true. The trial judge excluded questioning about Williams’s testimony in an unrelated murder trial after determining that the likelihood of confusion and undue delay outweighed the evidence’s value. The California Court of Appeal also found that the proposed questioning would have been cumulative because Williams’s credibility had already been extensively challenged.

The federal court distinguished Davis v. Alaska, where the defendant had been unable to create a record from which to argue that a witness was biased. Prescott’s trial record already showed that Williams had changed her account and had said she initially misled police to avoid being charged. The court concluded that additional questioning about the unrelated case would have addressed only credibility, which had been thoroughly covered, and that excluding it did not warrant relief.

Disposition

Judge Edward J. Davila denied Prescott’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court terminated Prescott’s request for an order and issued a certificate of appealability as to the first and second claims. The opinion does not state that the petition was denied with or without prejudice.