Forsyth v. HP Inc.

Background

The plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that HP’s workforce-reduction plan caused age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and other California laws. The complaint asserted both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories.

Fonseca stated that HP terminated his employment under the workforce-reduction plan on May 8, 2017. He later filed a separate action alleging similar violations of federal and California law. That action was removed to federal court and then remanded. A state court stayed its age-discrimination claims because of their overlap with this case.

Fonseca moved to intervene, meaning to become an additional party in the pending lawsuit. Both the plaintiffs and defendants opposed the motion.

Legal standard

The court considered intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). Intervention as of right requires a significant protectable interest, possible impairment of that interest, a timely application, and inadequate representation by the existing parties. Failure to satisfy any one requirement defeats the request.

Permissive intervention requires an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, a timely motion, and a common question of law or fact with the existing case. Even when those requirements are met, the court has discretion to deny intervention.

Intervention as of right

Fonseca argued that the existing plaintiffs did not adequately represent him because their complaint did not expressly plead his proposed claim that HP failed to prevent discrimination. He also pointed to their failure to amend the complaint and to their litigation strategy, including a two-year stay.

The court held that Fonseca and the existing plaintiffs shared the same ultimate objective: holding HP accountable for allegedly discriminating against employees age 40 and older who were terminated under the workforce-reduction plan. Fonseca conceded that he fit within the proposed California class. Because their ultimate objectives were the same, the court applied a presumption that the existing plaintiffs adequately represented Fonseca’s interests.

The court found that Fonseca did not make the required compelling showing to overcome that presumption. It concluded that the failure-to-prevent-discrimination theory was not absent from the case because such claims are derivative of discrimination claims and were covered by the existing pleadings. The court also held that differences in litigation strategy and disagreements about the pace of the case were insufficient to show inadequate representation.

The court therefore denied Fonseca’s motion to intervene as of right. A footnote states that the court did not reach Fonseca’s arguments concerning timeliness, protectable interest, or impairment.

Permissive intervention

Fonseca alternatively sought permissive intervention. The court found that his complaint did not show an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the claims he sought to bring in this action. Fonseca argued that separate antitrust claims pending in federal court supplied jurisdiction, but he acknowledged that those claims were unrelated to this case and did not seek to intervene on them.

The court found that Fonseca provided no supporting precedent for using unrelated antitrust claims as the jurisdictional basis for intervention in state-law and federal-law age-discrimination claims. Exercising its discretion, the court denied permissive intervention.

Disposition

The court denied Fonseca’s request to intervene as a plaintiff, including both intervention as of right and permissive intervention.