Arteaga v. City of Oakley

Background

Albert Arteaga sued officers of the City of Oakley Police Department, the City of Oakley, Police Chief Chris Thorsen, and other defendants. He alleged that, during a November 9, 2017 domestic-dispute response, Officer Daniel Buck tased him after Arteaga said “that’s enough” while observing officers use force against his uncle. Arteaga alleged that he was then arrested on a fabricated violation of California Penal Code section 148(a)(1), subjected to excessive force, and prosecuted based on a deliberately false police report. He alleged that a jury acquitted him of that charge on July 19, 2019.

Arteaga asserted three claims. His First Claim was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law, based on alleged violations of the First and Fourth Amendments against the officer defendants and others. His Second Claim was also brought under § 1983 and included a supervisor-liability claim against Chief Thorsen and other supervisors and a municipal-liability claim against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services. His Third Claim was a state-law malicious-prosecution claim against the officer defendants.

Defendants’ Motion

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. They argued that the Second Claim was too conclusory to show a plausible basis for liability.

For the municipal-liability portion, the defendants challenged Arteaga’s theories that the City had an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice; failed to train its officers; or ratified the alleged conduct. For the supervisor-liability portion, they argued that Arteaga had not alleged facts showing Chief Thorsen’s personal involvement or a causal connection between a supervisor’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violations.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that Arteaga had not alleged specific facts supporting the municipal-liability theories. He identified alleged practices such as “hurt a person – charge a person,” excessive force, false reporting, and a “code of silence,” but he alleged no other similar incidents or other specific facts showing that these practices were widespread and well established. The court therefore dismissed the Monell Claim to the extent it was based on an unconstitutional custom or practice.

The court also found Arteaga’s ratification allegations conclusory. He alleged that City or police-department policymakers had directed, encouraged, allowed, or ratified the conduct, but he did not allege specific facts showing that a final policymaker made a deliberate choice or approved the basis for the alleged unconstitutional conduct. The court dismissed the Monell Claim to the extent it was based on ratification.

As to failure to train, the court explained that municipal liability requires more than negligent or generally inadequate training; the alleged deficiency must amount to deliberate indifference to people’s rights. Arteaga did not identify the deficient training, explain the nature of the deficiencies, or allege how the training caused the officers’ conduct. The court dismissed the Monell Claim to the extent it was based on inadequate training.

The court separately held that the supervisor-liability allegations were entirely conclusory. Arteaga alleged no specific facts showing that Chief Thorsen or another supervisor was personally involved in the incident or that a supervisor’s wrongful conduct caused the alleged constitutional violations. The court dismissed the Second Claim to the extent it was based on supervisor liability.

Disposition

The court concluded that Arteaga might be able to amend the Second Claim and that amendment would not necessarily be futile. It therefore granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, dismissed the Second Claim with leave to amend, and allowed Arteaga 30 days from the date of the order to file an amended complaint. The opinion does not specify in the conclusion which other portions of the motion were denied.