Peterson v. United States of America

Background

Victoria R. Peterson alleged that William Martinez, a Bureau of Prisons employee, sexually abused her dozens of times over more than a year while she was housed at the Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin. She alleged that Martinez used his authority and work assignments to isolate her in places without security cameras. She also alleged that supervisors Joel Eddings and Bruce West knew Martinez was creating opportunities to be alone with her and did not stop him, and that other officials responded to reports of abuse by placing her in solitary confinement and changing her security classification.

Peterson asserted claims against Martinez under the Federal Tort Claims Act, or FTCA, which allows certain lawsuits against the United States for torts committed by federal employees. She also asserted negligence and emotional-distress claims directly against the United States, and constitutional damages claims against Wiley Jenkins under a judicially created remedy known as a Bivens action. Peterson initially filed the case without a lawyer, but the court later appointed pro bono counsel.

The government’s motion to substitute

The United States sought to replace Martinez as the defendant on the FTCA claims. The government relied on a certification stating that Martinez acted within the scope of his employment. Peterson challenged that certification, arguing that her amended complaint alleged facts showing Martinez’s conduct was outside his employment.

Applying California law, Judge Orrick held that Peterson alleged enough facts to rebut the certification at this stage. The court emphasized that Martinez was not assigned to the camp where Peterson lived and allegedly created opportunities to abuse her in locations without cameras. The court concluded that merely being on duty and holding a position of authority did not establish that Martinez acted within the scope of his employment when he allegedly abused Peterson.

The motion to substitute was DENIED. The government’s related motion to dismiss the FTCA claims was DENIED AS MOOT.

The government’s separate motion to dismiss

The United States separately sought dismissal of Peterson’s negligence, negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. It argued that Peterson had not properly completed the required administrative process, that her claims were based on federal statutes and prison regulations rather than state tort law, and that the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception barred parts of the claims.

Judge Orrick held that Peterson’s administrative claim gave the Bureau of Prisons enough information to investigate and placed a value on her alleged injuries. The court said she was not required to identify every employee involved. The court also concluded that the claims were based on duties arising under California tort law, even though references to the Prison Rape Elimination Act and Bureau of Prisons regulations could be used as evidence of the alleged failures.

The court rejected the government’s discretionary-function argument at this stage. Although some decisions about inmate placement, housing, supervision, and transfers involved judgment, the government had not shown that the particular decisions concerning Peterson were actually based on social, economic, or political policy. The court denied this part of the motion while allowing the government to raise the argument again later.

The government’s separate motion to dismiss was DENIED.

Jenkins’s motion to dismiss

Jenkins argued that Peterson’s constitutional damages claims presented a new Bivens context and that special factors counseled against creating a damages remedy. “Special factors” are considerations showing that Congress, rather than the courts, should decide whether such a remedy is available. Jenkins also raised arguments about insufficient pleading and qualified immunity.

Judge Orrick held that Peterson’s claims presented a new Bivens context and that special factors counseled hesitation. The court considered Congress’s treatment of prisoner lawsuits, the separation of powers and the specialized nature of prison administration, and the availability of other remedies, including the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative process, declaratory or injunctive relief, and FTCA claims. The court was not persuaded that this case warranted expanding the Bivens remedy.

The court stated that Peterson had alleged enough individual conduct by Jenkins to proceed to discovery and rejected the argument that the complaint failed to distinguish Jenkins from another official. But the court also concluded that Jenkins was entitled to qualified immunity on Peterson’s due-process claims concerning her security score and transfer because Peterson had not identified clearly established law governing those allegations.

Jenkins’s motion to dismiss was GRANTED. The order directed Martinez to respond to the claims against him by March 27, 2020, and set a case-management conference for April 7, 2020.