Bey v. Dimon
- Phyllis Hamilton
- 4:19-cv-07122
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 4
In Bey v. Dimon, Judge Hamilton dismissed Kirk Bey’s claims with prejudice after finding he failed to state legally cognizable claims.
Kirk Bey’s complaint was dismissed with prejudice, affecting his claims against the named defendants, including James Dimon and the JP Morgan Chase entities discussed in the order.
What happened
In Bey v. Dimon, Kirk Bey sued over defendants’ alleged efforts to enforce or sell a mortgage-related interest in property in Oakland, California. He claimed that his status as an “Aboriginal Moor” and a transfer involving his former name meant he owned the property and was not bound by the mortgage. He also asserted fraud, racketeering, embezzlement, and conspiracy claims.
The court found that Bey did not allege the required elements or enough specific facts to satisfy the federal pleading rules. It also ruled that the criminal statutes he cited do not generally create a right to sue for money or other civil relief. The court rejected his theory that being a Moor made him immune from generally applicable laws, concluding that without that theory he had no basis for alleging that defendants’ mortgage-related conduct was unlawful.
The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice because Bey identified no way to amend the complaint to state valid claims. The court also denied defendants’ requests for judicial notice as unnecessary. Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton issued the order.
The detailed version
- Bey v. Dimon · No. 4:19-cv-07122
- Phyllis Hamilton
- Mar. 2, 2020
Background
Kirk Bey sued James Dimon and other defendants over an alleged mortgage-related claim against property in Oakland, California. The complaint asserted fraud, refusal to acknowledge an entitlement to property, racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, embezzlement, and conspiracy and deprivation-of-rights claims under federal criminal statutes.
Bey alleged that the mortgage concerned his “former artificial entity,” identified as his former name, Kirk Eugene Nervis. He claimed that, as an “Aboriginal Moor” with a birthright entitlement to his own land or estate, he had transferred the property under a “Moor Nation Trust” and therefore was not a mortgage debtor. He alleged that JP Morgan Chase’s efforts to involve itself with the property, apparently including forcing a sale, or to require payment in United States dollars amounted to fraud, embezzlement, and conspiracy.
Bey represented himself. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under the federal pleading rules.
Court’s Analysis
The court concluded that Bey failed to state a claim. It found that he did not allege the underlying elements of his claims and did not provide facts specific enough to satisfy Rule 8’s general pleading requirement or Rule 9(b)’s heightened requirement for fraud allegations. The court also noted that Bey did not address the factual deficiencies identified in defendants’ motion in his late opposition.
The court separately rejected claims based on 18 U.S.C. § 153 and §§ 241 and 242 because those provisions are criminal statutes and, generally, do not create a private civil claim.
The court held that the central theory of the complaint was that Bey’s alleged status as a Moor gave him ownership of the property or immunity from generally applicable laws. Bey cited the treaty provision in Article VI of the Constitution but did not provide authority explaining how that provision gave him ownership of the property. Relying on decisions rejecting similar “sovereign citizen” arguments, the court concluded that being a Moor does not create immunity from United States law. Without that theory, the court found no basis for treating JP Morgan Chase’s efforts to maintain or enforce mortgage-related rights, including a possible sale of the property, as unlawful.
Disposition
The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. It explained that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because Bey had not identified any basis on which he could amend the complaint to state legally cognizable claims. The court also denied defendants’ requests for judicial notice, including any request implied by attachments to Bey’s opposition, because judicial notice was unnecessary to resolve the motion.
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton signed the order on March 2, 2020.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.