Witkin v. Saul

Background

Emily R. Witkin sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of her applications for Disability Insurance benefits and Disabled Adult Child benefits. She alleged that her disability began on November 24, 1986. The administrative law judge found that Witkin had severe impairments including alcohol abuse, major depressive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism spectrum disorder, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and personality disorder.

The administrative law judge found that Witkin’s impairments met the relevant listing criteria when her alcohol abuse was considered. The judge then determined that alcohol abuse was material to the finding of disability. After excluding the effects of alcohol use, the judge found that Witkin would continue to have severe impairments but would have only moderate limitations in two areas of mental functioning. The judge concluded that she could perform a range of work and therefore was not disabled.

Parties’ Arguments

Witkin moved for summary judgment, arguing that the administrative law judge improperly found alcohol use to be a material contributing factor, gave too much weight to the opinion of non-examining psychologist Kenneth Layton, failed to fully and fairly develop the record, and did not include all of her limitations in the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert. She requested reversal and remand for further proceedings. Saul opposed Witkin’s motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s findings and that the decision was free from reversible error.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that when a claimant is found disabled, the administrative law judge must determine whether the claimant would remain disabled if she stopped using drugs or alcohol. The administrative law judge must distinguish between substance use that contributes to disability and impairments that remain after substance use stops.

The court held that the administrative law judge did not adequately perform that analysis. The judge relied on evidence that alcohol use coincided with or contributed to Witkin’s symptoms, but did not analyze whether her disability would remain without alcohol use. The administrative law judge also did not identify which impairments would continue if Witkin stopped drinking. The court found that evidence of improved mood when sober was not enough to establish that alcohol use was material to her disability.

The court also held that the administrative law judge erred in giving great weight to Layton’s opinion. Layton had not considered Witkin’s testimony at the initial hearing or later-submitted evidence, and his conclusions were inconsistent with portions of the record, including evidence from treating providers concerning Witkin’s concentration, interaction with others, sensory overload, and anxiety. The court concluded that these errors independently warranted reversal.

The court did not reach Witkin’s remaining arguments concerning development of the record and the vocational expert’s hypothetical questions.

Disposition

The court GRANTED Witkin’s motion for summary judgment and DENIED Saul’s cross-motion for summary judgment. It REVERSED the Commissioner’s decision and REMANDED the case under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the order. The remand required the administrative law judge to reassess whether alcohol use was material to Witkin’s disability, identify the impairments that would remain without alcohol use, reevaluate the medical opinions, and consider the additional evidence included in the administrative record.