Mullan v. Daniels

Background

Joyce L. Mullan sued Chance Daniels, alleging defamation. Her amended complaint also asserted claims for trade libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Mullan alleged that Daniels had attempted to purchase one of her Standard Schnauzer puppies and that the parties entered into an agreement based on Daniels’s representations about his ability to raise, protect, and breed show puppies. She alleged that those representations were false.

Mullan further alleged that Daniels published statements on a publicly available website directed to people involved with Standard Schnauzer dogs. The statements called her a “disreputable breeder,” described a pending lawsuit, and accused her of various wrongdoing. She also alleged that Daniels posted signs or decals accusing her of harming dogs, posted her address and photographs of her residence, and threatened financial ruin if she did not do what he demanded. According to Mullan, her Standard Schnauzer sales then dropped drastically and interested clients withdrew their business. She also alleged severe emotional distress.

The court noted that it had previously dismissed the original complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on insufficient allegations supporting diversity jurisdiction. Mullan then filed the amended complaint at issue. Daniels moved to dismiss the trade-libel and emotional-distress claims and moved to strike allegations in Paragraph 18 concerning his representations about raising a puppy.

Trade libel

Trade libel concerns publication of material disparaging the quality of another person’s property when the publisher should recognize that the publication is likely to cause financial loss. Daniels argued that Mullan had not adequately alleged publication to a third party or financial harm.

The court disagreed. It concluded that Mullan’s allegations that Daniels published the statement on a nationally known website dedicated to Standard Schnauzer dogs and that the website was publicly available were sufficient to allege publication. The court also found sufficient Mullan’s allegation that her sales dropped drastically and that prospective clients withdrew their business after the statement was posted. The court therefore denied Daniels’s motion to dismiss the trade-libel claim.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct, an intent or reckless disregard regarding emotional distress, severe or extreme emotional distress, and causation. Daniels argued that Mullan had not alleged sufficiently outrageous conduct or specific facts about her distress.

The court declined to decide at the pleading stage that the alleged posting of Mullan’s addresses and home photographs and the alleged threat of financial ruin could not constitute outrageous conduct. But the court agreed that Mullan had not alleged specific facts about the nature and extent of her emotional or mental suffering. It granted Daniels’s motion to dismiss this claim and allowed Mullan to amend it. The court stated that any amendment must include specific facts about the emotional distress she had already suffered.

Negligent infliction of emotional distress

Negligent infliction of emotional distress requires serious emotional distress caused by wrongful conduct that a defendant should have foreseen would cause such distress. The court concluded that Mullan had not adequately pleaded serious emotional distress. It also explained that this claim is a form of negligence, which requires allegations concerning duty, breach, causation, and damages, and that intentional conduct cannot serve as the basis for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

The court granted Daniels’s motion to dismiss the negligent-infliction claim and allowed Mullan to amend it. The court stated that Mullan could not rely on the same intentional conduct as the basis for both emotional-distress claims.

Motion to strike and disposition

Daniels also moved to strike allegations that the puppy-sale agreement was based on his representations about his ability to raise a puppy and that those representations were false. The court denied that motion. It found that the allegations related to the truth of Daniels’s statements, including whether Mullan had tried to “steal” his dog and whether there was a valid reason for not selling the dog, as well as whether Daniels’s response was reasonable. The court found that the allegations were not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.

Judge Kandis A. Westmore’s order granted in part and denied in part Daniels’s motion. Specifically, the court denied the motion to dismiss the trade-libel claim; denied the motion to strike Paragraph 18’s allegations; and granted the motion to dismiss the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Mullan may file an amended complaint consistent with the order within 30 days of the order.