Freeman v. Foss

Background

Travon Leon Freeman, an inmate at Corcoran State Prison who had previously been housed at Salinas Valley State Prison, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviewed his second amended complaint under the prisoner-screening statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That screening requires the court to identify claims that may proceed and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant.

Freeman alleged that, beginning in mid-August 2018, Paicio, Sandquist, Banger, Cervantes, Salgado, and unidentified correctional officers verbally harassed him, referred disparagingly to his former status, and warned him against speaking with a correctional officer. He also alleged that the defendants made direct and indirect threats of assault. Freeman said he notified Warden Foss twice about the harassment and threats and told her he feared an assault. He alleged that numerous inmates attacked him on the prison yard on November 29, 2018, causing a cut to his nose and swelling near his right eye. He further alleged that Salgado later said that prison personnel had watched the attack and approved of it. Freeman also alleged that Foss knew most correctional officers on the relevant yard had previously been sued but did not retrain them or install cameras there.

Court’s analysis

The court explained that an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires allegations showing both an objectively serious deprivation and that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference means that the official knew about and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to reduce it.

Liberally construing Freeman’s pro se complaint, the court found that it stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Paicio, Sandquist, Banger, Cervantes, Salgado, and Foss. “Cognizable” here means that the allegations were sufficient at the initial screening stage for the claim to continue; the order did not enter a final judgment on the claim’s merits.

Unidentified defendants

The court stated that using “John Doe” defendants is generally disfavored, but recognized that a plaintiff may need discovery to learn unknown defendants’ identities. It therefore dismissed the Doe defendants without prejudice. If Freeman learned their identities through discovery, he could move to file a third amended complaint naming them.

Disposition and case management

The court ordered the Clerk to issue summonses and directed the U.S. Marshals Service to serve the second amended complaint and the order on Foss, Paicio, Sandquist, Banger, Cervantes, and Salgado. It required the defendants to file a summary-judgment motion, another dispositive motion, or a motion to stay within 91 days of the order. Freeman’s opposition would be due 28 days after a motion was filed, and any reply would be due 14 days after the opposition. The court stated that no hearing would be held on the motion.

The order also gave Freeman notices explaining what evidence would generally be needed to oppose summary judgment and how to respond to a motion to dismiss based on failure to complete available prison grievance procedures. It authorized discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and reminded Freeman of his responsibilities to serve filings, keep the court informed of address changes, comply with deadlines, and prosecute the case. The order was signed by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr.