Vasquez v. Koenig

Background

Alfredo M. Vasquez, who was incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed this self-represented petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asking the federal court to review his state-court convictions. A San Mateo County jury found him guilty of 68 felony offenses involving sexual abuse of Jane Doe. The state trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 48 years in prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court summarily denied further review.

Vasquez raised two principal claims. First, he argued that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by excluding evidence that Jane Doe had sexual intercourse with her boyfriend on the day she reported the abuse to police. Second, he argued that the trial court’s modified unanimity instruction, CALCRIM 3501, could have allowed the jury to convict without agreeing on the same criminal acts.

Legal standard

Under the federal habeas statute, a federal court may grant relief to a state prisoner only for custody that violates the Constitution, federal law, or a treaty. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, when a state court has decided a claim on the merits, the federal court generally may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law, or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Even when a constitutional error is shown, relief is unavailable unless the error had a substantial and harmful effect on the verdict.

Exclusion of evidence

The trial court excluded the evidence under California Evidence Code section 782 after finding that the evidence had, at most, minimal relevance to Jane Doe’s credibility and substantial potential for prejudice. The California Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It reasoned that the jury already knew Jane Doe had a boyfriend and that Vasquez opposed the relationship, which supplied the proposed motive to lie. The court concluded that the specific evidence of sexual activity added little and risked improper character-based judgments about Jane Doe.

Judge Chen held that the state appellate court’s decision was not contrary to, and did not unreasonably apply, United States Supreme Court precedent concerning a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense. The excluded evidence had only slight, if any, probative value, and Vasquez was able to present other evidence and argument concerning Jane Doe’s relationship with her boyfriend and a possible motive to fabricate. The court also held that the exclusion did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to question witnesses. Trial judges may impose reasonable limits on questioning that is marginally relevant, prejudicial, or confusing. In addition, any error would not have had a substantial and harmful effect on the judgment in light of the evidence, including Vasquez’s admissions that sexual abuse occurred. The court denied relief on this claim.

Modified unanimity instruction

The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict on each charged offense only if jurors either agreed on a specific act underlying the offense or agreed that Vasquez committed all the acts alleged during the relevant period and committed at least the number of offenses charged. The California Court of Appeal concluded that this instruction properly addressed repeated acts of child molestation that were described with both specific and general details.

Judge Chen held that Vasquez had not shown that the instruction violated federal law. The court explained that federal law requires jury instructions to be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and asks whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction unconstitutionally. The court also noted that, in a noncapital state criminal case, the federal Constitution does not itself require a unanimous jury verdict. The state court could reasonably have concluded that the jury believed Jane Doe’s testimony and rejected contrary testimony about when some events occurred. Vasquez also failed to show that any instructional error had a substantial and harmful effect on the verdict. The court denied relief on this claim.

Other claim and disposition

Vasquez briefly referred to ineffective assistance of counsel based on an alleged failure to obtain witnesses and documents. The court did not construe that reference as a separate claim because Vasquez did not identify the witnesses, describe their expected testimony, or identify the documents, and the claim had not been exhausted in state court. To the extent he intended to raise it, the court denied it.

The court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, denied a certificate of appealability, directed the clerk to enter judgment, and closed the file.