Deckard v. Berryhill

Background

Jason Deckard appealed the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his applications for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI. Deckard alleged disability beginning August 15, 2010, based on back pain, affective disorders, anxiety disorder, intellectual disability, and avoidant personality disorder. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Deckard was not disabled from the alleged onset date through September 27, 2017. The Appeals Council affirmed that decision.

The ALJ found severe impairments involving Deckard’s back, right lower extremity, affective disorders, and anxiety disorder. The ALJ classified his intellectual disability and avoidant personality disorder as non-severe, found that his impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment, and assessed a residual functional capacity (RFC)—the most a person can do despite limitations—for reduced-range light work involving simple, routine, unskilled tasks, occasional stooping, and occasional contact with coworkers or the public. Based on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, the ALJ found Deckard not disabled.

Court’s analysis

Deckard raised six challenges. He argued that the ALJ improperly treated his intellectual disability as non-severe, improperly evaluated medical opinions, incorrectly found that his impairments did not meet Listing 12.05(B), improperly rejected his testimony, assessed an RFC unsupported by substantial evidence, and improperly relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at step five.

The court held that any error in the ALJ’s step-two classification of intellectual disability was harmless because the ALJ continued through the remaining steps. The court also held that the ALJ adequately rejected the opinions of examining psychologists Laura Catlin and Ede Thomsen despite finding that two of the ALJ’s stated reasons—the providers’ reliance on Deckard’s subjective reports and Deckard’s work history and daily activities—were not adequate. The opinions of Aparna Dixit, Michael Auza, and M. Morando provided substantial evidence supporting that rejection. The court likewise held that the ALJ gave sufficient reasons to reject social worker Katrina Steer’s opinion.

The court found error in the ALJ’s treatment of portions of the opinions of Michael Auza and M. Morando. Those providers identified moderate limitations, including limitations involving regular attendance, punctuality, attention, concentration, detailed instructions, and workplace stress. The ALJ adopted some portions of their opinions but did not acknowledge or explain the rejection of these other limitations. Because the RFC did not include them, the court treated them as implicitly rejected without adequate explanation. The error was not harmless because the vocational expert testified that more than one absence per month would prevent sustainable employment for an individual limited to the full range of unskilled work.

The court also held that the ALJ did not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Deckard’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms. The court found that the ALJ relied too heavily on limited treatment, isolated statements denying depression or anxiety, and daily activities that did not adequately address Deckard’s reported difficulties with social interaction and functioning outside his home.

The court rejected Deckard’s challenge to the ALJ’s step-three finding concerning Listing 12.05(B), because the credited opinion of Dr. Dixit reported a full-scale IQ score of 80, while the lower scores relied on by Deckard came from opinions the ALJ permissibly rejected. However, because the RFC excluded limitations that required explanation and because the testimony was improperly discounted, the court held that the step-five determination based on that RFC was not supported by substantial evidence.

Disposition

The court concluded that the errors were not harmless and that further administrative proceedings were necessary to reassess the medical evidence, Deckard’s testimony, and the appropriate RFC. It therefore determined that an immediate award of benefits was not appropriate because the record did not establish what the proper RFC would be or whether work would exist for someone with that RFC.

Judge Beth Labson Freeman GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART Deckard’s motion for summary judgment, DENIED the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, REVERSED the denial of benefits, and REMANDED the matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings consistent with the order.