dela Cruz v. Brennan

Background

Fernando N. dela Cruz, who initially represented himself, sued Megan Brennan, identified in the opinion as Postmaster General, over events related to his former employment with the United States Postal Service. He alleged that he worked as a letter carrier for more than 15 years in Petaluma, California. After he reported that a delivery vehicle had a defective signal light and took stress leave, he alleged that supervisors marked him absent without authorization, followed or impeded him while he delivered mail, issued him a warning, investigated him, suspended him, and terminated him.

Dela Cruz’s second amended complaint asserted four claims: sex discrimination under Title VII; retaliation for taking leave he said was protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act; disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act; and retaliation under Title VII. He also moved for permission to add the Family and Medical Leave Act claim. Brennan moved to dismiss under Rules 8(a), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim, while Rule 12(b)(1) concerns subject-matter jurisdiction.

Sex and Disability Discrimination Claims

The court held that the requirement that a federal employee present a discrimination claim through the Equal Employment Opportunity process is a mandatory claim-processing requirement for Title VII purposes, rather than a jurisdictional requirement. The employee’s court claims must nonetheless be like or reasonably related to the allegations presented to the agency.

Dela Cruz’s Equal Employment Opportunity complaint checked only retaliation and described retaliation for grievances concerning an allegedly unsafe vehicle. It did not identify sex or disability discrimination. The court rejected his argument that identifying a female coworker who allegedly received more favorable treatment exhausted a sex-discrimination claim. It also rejected his argument that references to stress, medical treatment, and medical expenses presented a disability-discrimination claim. The court concluded that neither discrimination claim was presented to the agency or reasonably related to the retaliation allegation. It therefore dismissed both claims with prejudice.

Title VII Retaliation Claim

To state a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them. Protected activity must involve opposing conduct that the employee reasonably understood as discrimination under Title VII or participating in a proceeding concerning discrimination prohibited by Title VII.

The court found that the activities identified by dela Cruz—including opposing use of an unsafe vehicle, taking stress leave, filing grievances, complaining about workplace treatment, threatening to file administrative complaints, and refusing to sign a Last Chance Agreement—did not allege opposition to discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The court also noted that his eventual Equal Employment Opportunity complaint did not identify discrimination based on a Title VII category. Because he had already received one opportunity to amend, the court dismissed the Title VII retaliation claim with prejudice.

Family and Medical Leave Act Claim

The court treated dela Cruz’s request as a motion under Rule 15(a) to amend the complaint. It explained that leave to amend should generally be freely granted unless factors such as undue delay, prejudice, bad faith, or futility justify denial.

The proposed claim alleged that dela Cruz took stress leave from January 19 through January 29, 2016, after receiving a doctor’s note, and that Brennan retaliated against him through later workplace actions, including investigation, suspension, and termination. The court found that the complaint did not adequately allege that the employer was covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act, that dela Cruz was an eligible employee, or that his condition was a serious health condition qualifying for protected leave. It also found that the complaint did not provide enough detail about what notice he gave, when he gave it, what the doctor’s note said, or facts showing that the leave played a role in his termination.

The court nevertheless concluded that amendment would not necessarily be futile because its earlier permission to amend had not addressed a Family and Medical Leave Act interference claim. It granted dela Cruz one final opportunity to amend to state such a claim. The court stated that the third amended complaint need not assert claims other than a Family and Medical Leave Act claim and was due within 14 days.

Disposition

The court granted Brennan’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the sex-discrimination, disability-discrimination, and Title VII-retaliation claims with prejudice. It granted dela Cruz’s motion to allege a Family and Medical Leave Act interference claim and allowed 14 days for filing a third amended complaint. The opinion text does not identify the judge by name.