Sabr v. Saul

Background

Adeeba Sabr sought judicial review of an administrative law judge’s decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The administrative law judge found that Sabr had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date and had severe impairments including posttraumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, anxiety, obesity, and breast cancer in remission. The judge found that she could perform medium-level work limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, with limited decision-making, workplace changes, and interaction with coworkers and the public. The judge concluded that she could not perform her past work but could perform jobs such as hand packer, assembler, and machine feeder.

Issues and analysis

Sabr argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated medical opinions, assessed her testimony, determined her residual functional capacity, and relied on vocational-expert testimony based on an unsupported residual functional capacity.

The court focused on the treatment of the psychological evidence. It found that the administrative law judge relied too heavily on an earlier 2015 consultative evaluation while discounting more recent and more extensive evaluations from Dr. Lisa Kalich and Dr. Katherine Wiebe, as well as opinions from Sabr’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Summer Savon, and longtime therapist, Kristen Crowley. The court noted that the record showed Sabr’s mental-health condition progressively worsened after 2015.

The court found that the reasons given for rejecting Dr. Kalich’s and Dr. Wiebe’s opinions were insufficient. Their evaluations included clinical interviews, reviews of records, observations, and diagnostic testing, so the opinions could not be rejected merely because they also considered Sabr’s reported symptoms. The court also found that the administrative law judge incorrectly treated Dr. Savon’s opinion as merely repeating the earlier psychologists’ opinions, even though Dr. Savon had treated Sabr and relied on the earlier evaluations to expand her own assessment.

The court further found that the administrative law judge incorrectly stated that the record lacked treatment notes supporting Crowley’s opinion. The record contained more than 60 pages of therapy notes. The court also found that relying on isolated references to improved mood, apartment hunting, or good grooming did not provide adequate reasons for rejecting Crowley’s assessment.

Disposition

The court held that the administrative law judge failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions of Drs. Kalich, Wiebe, and Savon and failed to provide adequate reasons specific to Crowley for rejecting her opinion. Those errors produced a residual functional capacity inconsistent with the mental-health evidence and led to an erroneous finding at the fifth step of the disability analysis.

Applying the rule that improperly rejected evidence may be treated as true when the record is fully developed, the court found that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose. It also found that crediting the rejected opinions would require a finding that Sabr was disabled and that the record created no serious doubt about that conclusion. Judge Robert M. Illman therefore granted Sabr’s motion for summary judgment, denied Andrew Saul’s motion for summary judgment, reversed the administrative law judge’s finding of non-disability, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for calculation and award of appropriate benefits.