Williamson v. Genentech, Inc.

Background

Andrew Williamson brought this action on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals. He alleged that Genentech’s sale of Avastin, Rituxan, Kadcyla, and Xolair in single-dose vials inherently caused medication waste and violated California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code section 17200. Williamson alleged that he received Rituxan treatments and that, for most of those treatments, between 20 and 27.5 milligrams were discarded because the available vial sizes did not match his dosage.

Genentech removed the action from the San Mateo County Superior Court under the Class Action Fairness Act. Genentech then moved to dismiss based on federal preemption, California’s judicial-abstention doctrine, or failure to state a claim. Before addressing that motion, the court examined whether it had constitutional authority to hear the case.

Standing and Jurisdiction

Federal standing requires a plaintiff to allege a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and likely to be remedied by a favorable decision. The court focused on whether Williamson had alleged such an injury and whether he had standing to pursue claims involving drugs other than Rituxan. Because the court found no adequate injury, it did not reach the other standing questions.

Genentech argued that Williamson suffered an economic injury because he allegedly paid more than he would have paid if Rituxan had been offered in smaller vials. Williamson disagreed and stated that his out-of-pocket expense would have remained the same even if less medication had been wasted. The court concluded that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Williamson paid more because of the alleged waste. It also found that his general assertion of financial injury in the thousands was unsupported by factual allegations.

The court rejected Williamson’s reliance on California’s collateral-source rule, which can allow an injured person to recover damages without reducing them by payments from an independent source such as insurance. The court explained that restitution under California’s Unfair Competition Law requires the plaintiff to have lost money or property in which the plaintiff had an ownership or vested interest. Because Williamson’s insurer paid the relevant amounts and Williamson did not allege that he personally paid more due to the vial sizes, the court concluded that the rule did not establish his constitutional standing.

Disposition

The court concluded that Williamson lacked Article III standing to bring his Unfair Competition Law claim in federal court. Because the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it did not decide Genentech’s motion to dismiss or whether Williamson had statutory standing under California law. Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley remanded the action to the San Mateo County Superior Court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.