Harris v. Bullard
- Haywood Gilliam
- 4:19-cv-06648
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Harris v. Bullard, Judge Gilliam denied Harris’s motion to disqualify him, finding prior rulings did not establish judicial bias.
Zackary T. Harris and Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr.; the court denied Harris’s request to disqualify Judge Gilliam from the § 1983 action.
What happened
Zackary T. Harris, an inmate representing himself in a civil-rights lawsuit under a federal law allowing claims against state officials, asked to disqualify Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. from the case.
Harris argued that Judge Gilliam was biased because he had denied Harris’s request for a lawyer and his request for a temporary restraining order. Harris also objected to the case’s reassignment to Judge Gilliam.
Judge Gilliam denied the motion. He ruled that disagreements with a judge’s rulings generally are not a valid basis for disqualification and that Harris’s allegations were legally insufficient to show that the judge’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned.
The detailed version
- Harris v. Bullard · No. 4:19-cv-06648
- Haywood Gilliam
- Mar. 19, 2020
Background
Zackary T. Harris, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed a self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He moved to disqualify Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. based on alleged judicial bias and prejudice. The motion followed Judge Gilliam’s denial of Harris’s request for appointment of counsel and what Harris described as the premature denial of his request for a temporary restraining order. Harris also noted that the case had initially been assigned to Magistrate Judge Robert Illman before being reassigned to Judge Gilliam. The opinion states that the reassignment occurred because Harris had requested a temporary restraining order.
Legal standard
The court explained that motions to disqualify or recuse a judge are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Recusal is required when a reasonable person who knows all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The court also explained that a motion based on § 144 must include a legally sufficient affidavit alleging personal bias or prejudice. If the affidavit is insufficient, the challenged judge may decide the motion.
The court further stated that recusal generally must be based on an outside source of bias, rather than on the judge’s rulings, opinions, or statements made during the case. Judicial rulings may provide grounds for an appeal, but they generally do not provide a valid basis for recusal.
Ruling
Judge Gilliam held that Harris’s allegations did not establish a basis for recusal under either § 144 or § 455. The court found the motion legally insufficient because it relied on rulings made during the case rather than facts showing bias from an outside source. The court therefore denied Harris’s motion to disqualify the judge and stated that the order terminated docket entry 19.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.