Alva v. Berryhill

Background

Nancy Diane Alva sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for Title II disability benefits. Alva alleged that she had been disabled since November 1, 2011, because of temporomandibular joint syndrome, neck and back pain, and perforated disks in the upper spine. The Social Security Administration denied her application initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge denied the application on June 13, 2017, and the Appeals Council denied review on May 23, 2018.

Alva moved for summary judgment and requested payment of benefits or, alternatively, further proceedings. Nancy A. Berryhill filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

Legal standard

The court explained that it could reverse the Commissioner’s decision only if the findings were based on legal error or were not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate support for the conclusion. The court also described the Social Security Administration’s five-step process for evaluating disability claims, including the assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity, meaning the work the claimant can perform despite her impairments.

Alva’s treating-physician argument

Alva argued that the administrative law judge failed to give separate reasons for discounting the mental-limitations portion of opinions from her treating physician, Allen G. Gruber, M.D. Dr. Gruber diagnosed several physical conditions and identified depression, anxiety, possible personality disorder, impaired attention and concentration, impaired memory, and reduced ability to persist with tasks. His March 2016 opinion stated that Alva could not perform even low-stress work, while his June 2016 opinion stated that she could perform low-stress work.

The administrative law judge gave Dr. Gruber’s opinions partial weight because they were contradicted by the medical expert, the consultative examiner, and the longitudinal examinations. The judge also noted that the two opinions were close in time but inconsistent with each other.

The court found no error. Although the administrative law judge discussed Dr. Gruber’s opinions in a section focused on physical limitations, the discussion addressed mental limitations as well. The court pointed to evidence that agency doctors considered Alva’s alleged anxiety and affective disorders non-severe, that examinations did not show ongoing mental abnormalities, that there was no record of ongoing counseling or treatment, and that Dr. Gruber’s two opinions differed on important mental limitations. The court held that the administrative law judge gave specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for the weight assigned to Dr. Gruber’s opinions.

Alva’s examining-psychologist argument

Alva also challenged the administrative law judge’s decision to give little weight to Bonnie Yee, Psy.D., an examining psychologist. Dr. Yee reported that Alva had vague depressive and anxious symptoms that did not appear consistent with depression or anxiety diagnoses. Dr. Yee opined that Alva would have no difficulty with simple and repetitive tasks, minor difficulty with complex and detailed tasks, no difficulty working with other people, difficulty maintaining attention and concentration, and moderate difficulty handling employment stress.

The administrative law judge discounted Dr. Yee’s opinion because the longitudinal evidence did not support severe mental impairments. The court held that this was not merely an unsupported conclusion. The administrative law judge cited Alva’s reported ability to handle stress and routine changes, her performance on some attention and mathematical tasks during the examination, her normal immediate and remote memory, intact fund of knowledge, ability to provide background information, and adequate insight and judgment. The court concluded that these were specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for giving Dr. Yee’s opinion little weight.

Vocational-expert hypothetical

Alva argued that the administrative law judge’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert was incomplete because it did not include limitations involving understanding, memory, applying information, interacting with others, concentration, persistence, pace, or adapting and managing herself.

The court rejected the argument. It distinguished a prior appellate decision involving an administrative law judge who found mild mental limitations but failed to consider them later in the disability analysis. Here, the administrative law judge discussed Alva’s mental limitations when determining her residual functional capacity. The judge considered her daily activities and interactions, the mental abilities those activities required, differences between information Alva gave to Dr. Yee and information reported by Alva and her husband, and her husband’s report that she did not finish tasks. The court therefore found that the administrative law judge had not ignored the mental limitations identified earlier in the evaluation.

Disposition

The court denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Judge Kandis Westmore therefore rejected Alva’s challenges to the Commissioner’s disability-benefits decision.