Brown v. Berryhill

Background

Toni V. Brown sought judicial review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s final decision denying her claim for Social Security disability-insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Brown alleged mental-health and physical impairments, including post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, spinal degenerative-disc disease, and right-ankle problems. The administrative law judge found that Brown had several severe impairments and that her impairments met certain listed-impairment criteria while she was using substances. But the judge found that, if she stopped using illicit substances, her remaining impairments would not meet a listed impairment and she could perform medium work limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. The judge therefore found her not disabled because substance use was a contributing factor material to the disability determination.

Brown moved for summary judgment. The Commissioner opposed her motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

Medical-opinion evidence

The court held that the administrative law judge properly discounted examining physician Eugene McMillan’s opinion because the judge relied on Brown’s conservative and infrequent physical treatment and her reported improvement with chiropractic treatment. The court therefore found no error regarding that opinion.

The court held, however, that the administrative law judge improperly discounted the opinions of treating doctors Peter Newsom and Kapil Chopra. The judge relied on Global Assessment of Functioning scores and general statements that the doctors’ findings conflicted with Brown’s attention, concentration, and memory. The court found those reasons were not supported by substantial evidence and were not specific enough.

The court also held that the judge improperly discounted treating psychologist Kambiz Sakhai’s opinions. The judge criticized the opinions as being on a check-box form, inconsistent with treatment notes after sobriety, and unsupported by objective evaluations. The court found those reasons were not specific, legitimate, or supported by substantial evidence. It said Sakhai’s treatment notes contained evidence about Brown’s nightmares, difficulty sleeping, inability to leave home, and worsening memory and concentration, which the judge had overlooked.

The court further held that the administrative law judge erred by failing to address the opinions of three treating providers at the Portia Belle Hume Center: Nithya Narayan, Nancy Morgan, and Caruso-Maxey. The court noted that the judge did discuss Kermit Johnson’s findings, but did not address the other three providers’ opinions. The court found that omission was error.

The court found no error in the judge’s treatment of social workers Chika and A’Zah Williams. Because their opinions conflicted with the opinion of a treating psychiatrist, the judge could reject them by giving a germane, or specifically relevant, reason. The court found that the stated conflict with the psychiatrist’s opinion was such a reason.

Brown’s testimony and remaining findings

The administrative law judge found that Brown’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably produce her alleged symptoms, but that her statements about the intensity and effects of those symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence. Because the judge relied in part on the medical-opinion findings that the court required the agency to reconsider, the court also remanded the assessment of Brown’s testimony.

The court likewise remanded the finding about the materiality of substance use. Social Security law requires the agency to determine whether a claimant would remain disabled if substance use stopped. Because that determination was based on medical opinions and testimony that needed to be reconsidered, the court remanded the substance-use analysis as well.

The court remanded the residual functional capacity, meaning the most work a person can perform despite her limitations, because it was based on the challenged medical-opinion and testimony assessments. It also remanded the step-five finding that Brown could adjust to other work because that finding depended on the same assessments.

Disposition

The court granted Brown’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the order. The opinion did not award benefits or make a final finding that Brown was disabled.