Bunting v. Berryhill

Background

Suzan Lynn Bunting sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner’s denial of her applications for Title II and Title XVI Social Security benefits. She alleged that her disability began on April 25, 2011. After the Social Security Administration denied her applications initially and on reconsideration, an administrative law judge held a hearing and denied the applications on August 30, 2017.

Bunting moved for summary judgment, asking the court to order payment of benefits or, alternatively, to remand the case for further proceedings. Nancy A. Berryhill filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment.

Legal standard

The court explained that it could reverse the Commissioner’s decision if the administrative law judge applied the wrong legal standard or reached findings unsupported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion, considering both evidence supporting and detracting from the decision.

Analysis

Bunting raised five primary challenges: the rejection of her testimony, the rejection of lay witness testimony, the treatment of opinions from her treating doctors, the rejection of her therapist’s opinion, and the failure to include concentration, persistence, and pace limitations in her residual functional capacity assessment.

Bunting’s testimony. The court found that the administrative law judge gave several valid reasons for discounting Bunting’s testimony. The judge identified conflicts between her reported limitations and activities such as walking for 30 to 60 minutes each day, babysitting, volunteering, socializing, exercising, and planning to attend a conference. The judge also relied on what was described as conservative treatment, including over-the-counter pain medication, a TENS unit, and gabapentin.

The court agreed that the administrative law judge erred by relying on reported improvement in Bunting’s attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and depression without adequately discussing the course of her treatment. The court nevertheless found that error harmless because the other stated reasons were sufficient.

Lay witness testimony. The court found no error in rejecting statements from Bunting’s sister, Joanne Cooper, and friend, Alexandra Brown. The court reasoned that the valid reasons for discounting Bunting’s testimony also applied to similar statements from those witnesses, including statements about Bunting’s lack of social contact and limited ability to leave home.

Dr. Wilson’s opinion. Jennifer Wilson, M.D., treated Bunting beginning in January 2016. Dr. Wilson stated that Bunting could not regularly perform sedentary or light work and had significant limitations involving attention, concentration, pain, fatigue, depression, and attention-deficit disorder.

The administrative law judge gave Dr. Wilson’s opinion little weight, calling its limitations too extreme, finding them inconsistent with supposedly unremarkable treatment notes, and describing the treatment relationship as limited. The court found that reasoning inadequate. The notes the administrative law judge relied on described pain, fatigue, memory problems, insomnia, anxiety, depression, chronic pain syndrome, migraines, post-Lyme disease syndrome, and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. The judge also failed to consider later treatment notes closer in time to Dr. Wilson’s opinion. The court held that the administrative law judge did not identify a specific, legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence for giving Dr. Wilson’s opinion little weight.

Dr. Cain’s opinion. Janet Cain, Ph.D., performed a psychological evaluation and found moderate depression, high anxiety, significant attention problems, and limitations in daily living, following instructions, adapting to changes, attendance, and interacting with others. The administrative law judge gave the opinion partial weight.

The court upheld that part of the decision. It found that the administrative law judge reasonably relied on the many normal mental-status examinations and on activities such as living alone, caring for dogs, handling personal care, preparing meals, doing laundry, and performing household chores. The court held that the administrative law judge gave specific and legitimate reasons for discounting portions of Dr. Cain’s opinion.

Ms. Voska’s opinion. Michele Voska, a treating therapist, stated that Bunting’s depression, anxiety, pain, and other symptoms seriously limited her ability to leave home, interact with others, follow instructions, maintain attention and concentration, respond to supervisors, and work.

The court held that the administrative law judge improperly rejected Ms. Voska’s opinion. Although a therapist was not an acceptable medical source under the rule discussed by the court, the administrative law judge still had to give reasons specifically related to the witness and evaluate factors such as the treatment relationship, examinations, support for the conclusions, consistency with the record, and specialization. The administrative law judge only stated that the opinion was inconsistent with the record and did not explain that conclusion or meaningfully consider the approximately one-and-a-half-year treatment relationship. The court found that the rejection was not supported by substantial evidence.

Concentration, persistence, and pace. Bunting argued that the residual functional capacity assessment failed to reflect the administrative law judge’s finding that she had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and maintaining pace. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the authority Bunting cited concerned the completeness of questions posed to a vocational expert, not the separate requirements for a residual functional capacity assessment.

Disposition

The court granted Bunting’s motion for summary judgment and denied Berryhill’s cross-motion for summary judgment. It remanded the case because it was not clear that proper evaluation of all the evidence would necessarily require a finding that Bunting was disabled. On remand, the administrative law judge must properly evaluate the medical evidence under applicable law and consistent with the opinion.