Hall v. Amtrak, National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Background

Randy Lee Hall brought a wrongful-death action after his daughter, Dejani Hall, was struck and killed by an Amtrak train on August 4, 2016. The complaint named National Railroad Passenger Corporation, also called Amtrak, Jonathan Staska, Denise Hogg, Michael Torrence, BNSF Railway Company, and Doe defendants. The opinion states that Hall initially filed the action without a lawyer and later obtained counsel.

Hall sought leave to amend his second amended complaint. The proposed changes would withdraw his second cause of action and replace a reference to California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 with sections 377.20 through 377.43. The defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint, including the proposed amendments, under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally valid claim.

Motion to Amend

The court granted Hall’s motion for leave to amend. Although the case-management deadline for amended pleadings had passed, the court found good cause because Hall had only recently retained counsel and the proposed changes were procedural, did not change the substance of the claims or damages, and would not reopen discovery or delay the case.

The court also held that the proposed survivor claim related back to the original complaint. An amendment relates back when it arises from the same conduct or occurrence described in the original pleading. The court found that both claims arose from the same facts—the train’s collision with and death of Hall’s daughter—and therefore rejected the argument that the amendment was barred by the statute of limitations.

Motion to Dismiss

The court granted dismissal of Hall’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Under California law, a plaintiff seeking damages for witnessing a negligently caused injury must allege, among other things, presence at the scene when the injury occurred. Hall alleged that he was the victim’s father and suffered severe emotional distress, but he did not allege that he was present at or near the tracks when the train struck his daughter.

The court denied the motion to dismiss all claims against BNSF. It concluded that the claims against BNSF related back to Hall’s original complaint because the claims arose from the same conduct, and it agreed with Hall that BNSF’s relationship to the incident and its shared counsel with Amtrak supported the required notice and mistake allegations.

The court denied as moot the motion to dismiss Hall’s survivor claim because the court had already determined that the added statutes related back and did not create a new claim. The court also denied as moot the defendants’ motion to dismiss Hall’s second cause of action because Hall’s amendment withdrew that cause of action.

Finally, the court denied the motion to dismiss Hall’s request for punitive damages. The court found that allegations describing the defendants’ conduct as recklessly and wantonly indifferent to Dejani Hall’s life were sufficient at the pleading stage to allege malice. It also noted that Hall sought punitive damages under his negligence and dangerous-condition claims, not under the wrongful-death claim.

Disposition

The court granted Hall’s motion for leave to amend. It dismissed the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, with the specific rulings described above. The order allowed Hall to seek leave to amend the dismissed claim by motion and instructed him to explain how a proposed amendment would correct the deficiencies identified by the court. Judge Alsup signed the order.