United States v. Hughes
- Joseph Spero
- 3:18-cv-05931
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
In United States v. Hughes, Judge Spero denied Timberly E. Hughes’s motion to disqualify him based on comments during a default-judgment hearing.
Timberly E. Hughes and the United States. The order denied Hughes’s request to disqualify Judge Joseph C. Spero from the case.
What happened
In United States v. Hughes, the United States sued Timberly E. Hughes to collect civil penalties for allegedly failing to report interests in or authority over foreign bank accounts. Hughes did not initially respond to the lawsuit and later filed a motion asking for a fair and impartial hearing.
Hughes said comments made by the judge during a hearing on the government’s request for a default judgment showed that the judge had already decided her actions were willful. She also said she felt bullied when asked whether she intended to contest the government’s motion. The government’s position on the disqualification motion is not described in detail in the opinion.
Judge Joseph C. Spero denied the motion for disqualification. He ruled that Hughes’s supporting affidavit was legally insufficient because it relied on comments and events from the case itself, rather than showing bias from an outside source, and that the comments did not show deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.
The detailed version
- United States v. Hughes · No. 3:18-cv-05931
- Joseph Spero
- Mar. 31, 2020
Background
The United States sued Timberly E. Hughes to collect civil penalty assessments under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5), commonly called foreign-bank-account-reporting penalties. The penalties concerned alleged failures to timely report Hughes’s financial interest in, or signatory authority over, foreign bank accounts for calendar years 2010 through 2013.
Hughes, who was represented by an attorney when service was waived, did not answer or otherwise respond by the deadline in the parties’ final time-extension stipulation. The Clerk entered default. The United States then moved for default judgment. Hughes did not file an opposition, but she appeared by telephone at the February 7, 2020 hearing and asked the court to delay entering judgment for two weeks. She said an Internal Revenue Service offer-in-compromise officer had told her that the judgment could affect her offer. She also told the court that she did not contest the motion for default judgment.
On February 10, 2020, Hughes filed a request for permission to answer late, which the court construed as a motion to set aside the entry of default. On March 5, 2020, she filed the motion addressed in this order, titled a motion for a fair and impartial hearing. The court construed it as a motion to disqualify the judge.
Hughes’s allegations
Hughes alleged that during the default-judgment hearing the court said it would be difficult for her to convince the court that her actions were not willful. She also alleged that the court had effectively already decided that her actions were willful, questioned her about evidence concerning her financial circumstances, and agreed with government counsel that she needed to decide whether she intended to contest the motion. Hughes said she felt bullied by the judge and the government attorney and believed she had been baited into discussing the merits of the case.
Legal standard
The court considered the motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Section 144 allows a party to seek disqualification based on personal bias or prejudice, but requires a timely and legally sufficient affidavit stating facts supporting that claim. Section 455 requires a judge to disqualify himself when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned or when he has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
The court explained that the standards for bias under the two statutes are the same, but their procedures differ. Under Section 144, a legally sufficient affidavit must be referred to another judge for a decision on the merits. Section 455 contains no such referral procedure and instead requires the challenged judge to determine whether recusal is warranted.
The court stated that remarks or opinions based on facts presented during the current or earlier proceedings generally do not establish bias unless they show deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. A judge’s views on legal issues, and ordinary critical or disapproving remarks made during a proceeding, ordinarily are not enough to require disqualification.
Court’s analysis
The court found Hughes’s affidavit legally insufficient under Section 144. Hughes did not allege bias based on an outside source; her allegations concerned remarks made during the hearing on the government’s default-judgment motion. The court stated that it had not unequivocally said Hughes’s actions were willful, but had discussed the evidence she would need to support her position because she had not opposed the motion before the hearing.
The court further found that the alleged remarks did not show the required deep-seated favoritism or antagonism. It also concluded that the court’s agreement that Hughes should clarify whether she intended to contest the motion did not establish such bias. Under Section 455, the court likewise found no basis for disqualification and concluded that the comments did not create reasonable grounds to question its impartiality.
Disposition
The court denied Hughes’s motion for disqualification. This order decided only the request to disqualify the judge; it did not resolve the United States’ underlying claim for civil penalties or Hughes’s motion to set aside the entry of default.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.