Sullivan v. Storer Transit Systems

Background

Fatima Sullivan sued Storer Transit Systems, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and related claims under sections 54 and 54.1 of the California Civil Code, as well as negligent infliction of emotional distress. She alleged that, while returning from Graton Resort & Casino to San Francisco on a Storer bus, a driver told her she could not sit in the bus’s priority seating area because it was reserved for people with disabilities. Sullivan said she identified herself as disabled, but the driver said she did not have a walker or cane and called a Graton security guard. A non-disabled passenger was later allowed to sit in the priority area. Sullivan also alleged that she had post-traumatic stress disorder, was recovering from left knee surgery, and had limitations in her right hand, but the complaint did not identify which condition supported her claims or explain how any condition affected her abilities.

The Motions and the Court’s Analysis

Storer moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. It also moved under Rule 12(f) to strike references to unknown “Doe” defendants and Sullivan’s request for ADA damages.

The court denied the Rule 12(b)(1) motion. For Article III standing—the constitutional requirement that a plaintiff show an injury connected to the defendant’s conduct that a court can remedy—the court held that Sullivan alleged an injury from being denied priority seating, that the alleged injury was traceable to the Storer driver, and that the allegation that she regularly visited the casino supported a likelihood of recurrence. The court concluded that Sullivan had Article III standing, while noting that whether she qualified as disabled under the ADA was a separate question.

The court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. To state a public-accommodation disability-discrimination claim under the ADA, Sullivan had to allege that she was disabled under the statute, that Storer operated a place of public accommodation, and that Storer denied her public accommodations because of her disability. The court held that her statement that she “is disabled” was conclusory and that she had not alleged that her post-traumatic stress disorder, knee surgery, or hand impairment limited a major life activity. The court also stated that allegations about the effects of her impairments were needed to determine whether she was disabled and whether the refusal to let her use priority seating constituted denial of equal access because of a disability.

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over Sullivan’s California claims because the ADA claim was being dismissed. It did not separately resolve the merits of the state-law claims.

The court denied the motion to strike. Storer provided no supporting authority for striking the Doe defendants, and the court found little value in striking that reference. The court agreed that compensatory damages were not available under the ADA itself but held that California law allows damages for ADA violations. It therefore declined to strike Sullivan’s damages request, while directing her to place any damages request under the statutes that directly authorize recovery.

Disposition

Judge Joseph C. Spero dismissed Sullivan’s complaint with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. Storer’s motion was granted with respect to Rule 12(b)(6) and denied with respect to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(f). Sullivan could file an amended complaint no later than April 21, 2020.