Bent v. Barr

Background

Claude Bent, a 58-year-old lawful permanent resident from Jamaica, was in Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody while his removal proceedings continued. He had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder and had served a sentence of slightly more than thirteen years. The Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings in 2016, asserting that his attempted-murder conviction was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The immigration judge found Bent removable. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed, but the Ninth Circuit later remanded the case for the Board to consider whether the California murder statute covered conduct that was broader than the federal definition of murder, including feticide. After the remand, the Board found that part of the California statute was broader than the federal definition but also found that the statute’s coverage of murder of a human being matched the federal definition. The Board sent the issue back to the immigration judge because evidentiary issues remained unresolved. The opinion states that the final outcome of Bent’s removal proceedings was still pending.

Bent had been denied bond in 2017 after an immigration judge found by clear and convincing evidence that he posed a danger to the community and was a flight risk. In June 2019, he requested another bond hearing based on the Ninth Circuit’s remand of his removal case. The immigration judge denied that request, finding both that Bent was not eligible for another hearing after the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez and that he had not shown materially changed circumstances.

Habeas Petition and Exhaustion

Bent filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking release from custody or an individualized custody hearing. He also sought a temporary restraining order requiring a hearing or release while the court considered his petition.

The court explained that federal courts generally require people bringing this type of petition to first use available administrative remedies. Bent had appealed the denial of his requested bond hearing to the Board of Immigration Appeals, but approximately nine months had passed without a decision. Because the administrative proceeding had exceeded the parties’ estimates and nothing indicated that a decision was soon forthcoming, the court found the administrative remedies inadequate and waived that exhaustion requirement.

Statutory Eligibility for Another Bond Hearing

Bent argued that he was not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), partly because he had a substantial argument against his removability. He also argued that he was entitled to a hearing under Ninth Circuit precedent concerning prolonged detention. The court did not decide whether Bent was subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) or discretionary detention under § 1226(a).

Instead, the court assumed for purposes of its analysis that Bent was subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). Under the applicable regulation, a person seeking another bond hearing must show that circumstances materially changed since the prior bond decision. The court found that Bent had not made that showing. Although he argued that the remand in his removal case could reduce his flight risk, he did not explain why the remand affected the earlier finding that he posed a danger to the community. Because the immigration judge had found dangerousness, the court concluded that Bent needed to identify a material change relevant to that finding, which he had not done.

Due Process Analysis

Bent also argued that prolonged detention without another individualized bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process. The court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings addressed statutory issues but did not resolve whether prolonged detention without an individualized hearing violates due process. The court also noted that there was no controlling authority establishing a fixed time when detention becomes unconstitutional.

The court therefore applied the three-part test from Mathews v. Eldridge. That test considers the private interest affected, the government’s interest, and the value that additional safeguards would provide.

The court found that Bent’s private interest strongly favored him because he had been detained for more than three years and had not received a bond hearing since November 2017. The government had a legitimate and significant interest in maintaining its existing procedures and carrying out removal proceedings in an orderly and timely manner, so that factor favored the government. The court found that a third hearing would add little value because Bent had already received two bond hearings, had not challenged the adequacy of those hearings, and had not shown a material change in circumstances. The Mathews factors therefore favored the government, and Bent was not entitled to another bond hearing as a matter of due process.

Disposition

Judge Donna M. Ryu denied Bent’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court denied the temporary restraining order as moot because it sought the same relief as the petition: release or a bond hearing.